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  OPINION 
________________                              
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge.  
 The Recess Appointments Clause in the 
Constitution provides that ―[t]he President shall have 
Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the 
Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which 
shall expire at the End of their next Session.‖ U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 3. The central question in this case is the 
meaning of ―the Recess of the Senate,‖ which is the only 
time in which the president may use his power to recess 
appoint officers. Three definitions have been offered: (1) 
breaks between sessions of the Senate (i.e., ―intersession 
breaks‖); (2) these intersession breaks as well as breaks 
within a session (i.e., ―intrasession breaks‖) that last for a 
non-negligible time, or (3) any break in Senate business 
that makes the body unavailable to provide advice and 
consent on the president‘s nominations. This is a difficult 
 6 
 
question that has never been addressed by our Court or 
the Supreme Court. We hold that ―the Recess of the 
Senate‖ in the Recess Appointments Clause refers to only 
intersession breaks. As a consequence, we conclude that 
the National Labor Relations Board panel below lacked 
the requisite number of members to exercise the Board‘s 
authority because one panel member was invalidly 
appointed during an intrasession break. We will therefore 
vacate the Board‘s orders. 
I 
 New Vista operates a nursing and rehabilitative 
care center in Newark, New Jersey. On January 25, 2011, 
a healthcare workers‘ union petitioned the National 
Labor Relations Board (―the Board‖) for certification as 
the representative for New Vista‘s licensed practical 
nurses (―LPN‖). New Vista opposed this certification on 
the grounds that its LPNs are supervisors who cannot 
unionize under the National Labor Relations Act 
(―NLRA‖), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), (11). See NLRB v. 
Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 709 
(2001) (explaining that supervisors do not fall within the 
NLRA‘s definition of a bargaining unit). On March 9, 
2011, the Board‘s regional director determined that New 
Vista‘s LPNs were not supervisors and thus certified the 
union as well as ordered an election. New Vista appealed 
to the Board, which affirmed the regional director‘s 
order. 
 7 
 
The union won a majority in the ensuing election. 
New Vista refused to bargain with the union,
1
 which then 
filed a charge of unfair labor practices against New Vista 
before the Board. On behalf of the union, the Board‘s 
general counsel moved for summary judgment against 
New Vista, which New Vista opposed. The Board 
unanimously granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Union and against New Vista in a ―decision and order‖ 
dated August 26, 2011.  
This order was issued by a three-member ―delegee 
group‖ of the Board. The NLRA establishes that the 
Board is composed of up to five members, appointed by 
the president and confirmed with the advice and consent 
of the Senate. 29 U.S.C. § 153(a). Section 153(b) 
authorizes the Board to ―delegate to any group of three or 
more members any or all of the powers which it may 
itself exercise.‖ Id. § 153(b). These delegee groups must 
                                                 
1
 Refusal to bargain is a common way to obtain judicial 
review of representation determinations like the Board‘s 
affirmation of the regional director‘s March 9, 2011 
decision for which direct review is unavailable. NLRB v. 
Kentucky River Cmty. Care Inc., 532 U.S. at 709 
(explaining that ―direct judicial review of representation 
determinations is unavailable‖ but that indirect review 
may be obtained by refusing to bargain and thereby 
inducing the Board to file an unfair labor practice claim 
(citing AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 409–11 (1940)). 
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―maintain a membership of three in order to exercise the 
delegated authority of the Board.‖ New Process Steel, 
L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2644 (2010).  
Importantly, this three-member-composition 
requirement is distinct from § 153(b)‘s quorum 
requirements. The quorum requirements speak to the 
number of members who must be present to exercise the 
Board‘s powers for either the Board itself or a properly 
constituted three-member (or more) delegee group. See 
id. at 2642–43 (explaining that the ―group quorum 
provision‖ ―authorizes two members to act as a . . . group 
of at least three members‖ but does not ―authorize two 
members to constitute a valid delegee group‖); see also 
id. at 2642 (defining quorum as ―the number of members 
of a larger body that must participate for the valid 
transaction of business‖). To have a quorum, a delegee 
group must have at least two of its three members present 
and the Board must have at least three of its five 
members present. 29 U.S.C. § 153(b).  
In contrast, the three-member-composition 
requirement speaks to how many members are required 
for a delegee group to be a properly constituted body that 
can exercise the Board‘s powers. These different 
requirements are certainly related, but this case simply 
turns on whether the delegee group that issued the 
August 26 Order and the subsequent reconsideration 
orders had three members. 
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 On September 7, 2011, New Vista filed a motion 
with the Board to reconsider the August 26 Order. The 
company argued that the three-member delegee group 
acted ultra vires because although the order is dated 
August 26—one day before one member, Wilma 
Liebman, resigned—it was not issued until it was mailed 
during the week of August 29. This would mean, 
according to New Vista, that the panel had only two 
members when the order was issued, thereby violating 
29 U.S.C. § 153(d)‘s three-member-composition 
requirement. The company also argued that the 
August 26 Order was substantively incorrect. Meanwhile, 
on September 13, 2011, the Board filed with this Court 
an application for enforcement of the August 26 Order. 
We granted an uncontested motion to hold in abeyance 
the filing of the administrative record pending resolution 
of the motion for reconsideration. This functionally acted 
as a stay of the proceedings before us.  
 On December 30, 2011, the Board denied New 
Vista‘s motion for reconsideration. New Vista took two 
actions. First, it filed a second motion for reconsideration 
on January 3, 2012. In this motion, the company argued 
that the three-member December 30 delegee group was 
improperly constituted and thus without power to issue 
the order because one of the panelists was recused from 
the case. The company also argued in a March 14 
―further motion for reconsideration‖ that the December 
30 Reconsideration Order delegee group was improperly 
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constituted because one of the panelists was a recess 
appointee whose term concluded at the end of the 
Senate‘s 2011 session—which New Vista contended was 
December 17, 2007, thirteen days before the December 
30 Reconsideration Order was issued. 
Second, on January 9, 2012, New Vista filed a 
petition for review of the December 30 Reconsideration 
Order with this Court. We have treated this petition as a 
cross-petition for review opposing the Board‘s petition 
for enforcement of the August 26 Order. We also granted 
another Board motion to hold in abeyance the filing of 
the administrative record for these petitions until New 
Vista‘s second motion for reconsideration was resolved. 
This, again, functionally acted as a stay of the 
proceedings before us. 
 On March 15, 2012, the Board denied New Vista‘s 
second motion for reconsideration. This order did not 
address the company‘s March 14 argument that the term 
of one panelist had ended on December 17. On March 
22, 2012, New Vista filed a third motion for 
reconsideration. This motion reiterated the company‘s 
March 14 argument that the December 30 delegee group 
was improperly constituted because the Senate‘s session 
had ended on December 17. The motion also argued that 
the three-member delegee group that issued the March 15 
Reconsideration Order lacked three members because 
two of its members were invalidly appointed to the Board 
under the Recess Appointments Clause while the Senate 
 11 
 
was not in ―recess.‖ In sum, New Vista argued that if the 
Senate‘s session had ended when it began using pro 
forma sessions, then the December 30 panel had only two 
members because the term of one of its members expired. 
But if the Senate‘s session did not end at that time, then 
the March 15 panel was improperly constituted because 
the president‘s recess appointments were invalidly made 
while the Senate was not in recess. The Board denied this 
motion on March 27, 2012. The Board also filed the 
administrative record with this Court on that date, 
thereby stripping itself of jurisdiction. See 29 U.S.C. 
§ 160(e) (―Upon the filing of the record with it the 
jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its 
judgment and decree shall be final.‖). 
 On April 4, 2012, New Vista filed a petition for 
review of the March 15 and March 27 Reconsideration 
Orders. We granted New Vista‘s request that this petition 
be consolidated with New Vista‘s earlier petition for 
review for all purposes. These consolidated petitions for 
review are collectively a cross petition opposing the 
Board‘s petition for enforcement of the August 26 Order. 
II 
We consider sua sponte whether the delegee group 
that issued the August 26 Order had jurisdiction. See 
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Bd., 475 U.S. 534, 541 
(1986) (explaining that ―every federal appellate court has 
a special obligation to ‗satisfy itself not only of its own 
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jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause 
under review,‘ even though the parties are prepared to 
concede it‖ (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 
244 (1934))). In their initial briefs, the parties contended 
that the delegee group had subject-matter jurisdiction 
under 29 U.S.C. § 160(a), which ―empower[s]‖ the Board 
(and its three-member delegee groups) ―to prevent any 
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . 
affecting commerce.‖ We do not doubt that § 160(a) 
provides one jurisdictional requirement for the Board to 
adjudicate a case. But that does not preclude others. We 
have thus inquired whether 29 U.S.C. § 153(b)‘s three-
member-composition requirement is jurisdictional. We 
hold that it is. 
This Court has previously explained that ―the 
overall authority of the Board to hear [a] case under the 
NLRA‖ is a jurisdictional question that ―‗may be raised 
at any time.‘‖ NLRB v. Konig, 79 F.3d 354, 360 (3d Cir. 
1996) (quoting NLRB v. Peyton Fritton Stores, Inc., 336 
F.2d 769, 770 (10th Cir. 1964)); see also Polynesian 
Cultural Center, Inc. v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 467, 472 (9th 
Cir. 1978). Under § 153(b) and New Process Steel, 
delegee groups of the Board do not have statutory 
authority to act if they have fewer than three members. 
New Process Steel, 130 S. Ct. at 2644; Teamsters Local 
Union No. 523 v. NLRB, 624 F.3d 1321, 1322 (10th Cir. 
2010) (holding that a ―two-member NLRB group that 
issued the order in this case lacked statutory authority to 
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act‖ (emphasis added)). The three-member-composition 
requirement is thus jurisdictional because it goes to the 
Board‘s authority ―to hear [a] case under the NLRA.‖ 
Konig, 79 F.3d at 360. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ―has endeavored 
in recent years to ‗bring some discipline‘ to the use of the 
term ‗jurisdictional.‘‖ Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 
648 (2012) (quoting Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 
1197, 1202–03 (2011)). So there may be reason to 
believe that Konig‘s analysis and the subsequent 
jurisdictional conclusion for this case are no longer valid. 
Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc. v. Cnty. of Lebanon, 538 
F.3d 241, 249 n.16 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that ―[a]n 
intervening decision of the Supreme Court is a sufficient 
basis for us to overrule a prior panel‘s opinion without 
referring the case for an en banc decision‖). Our review 
of the Court‘s recent clarification shows that Konig 
remains good law and that the three-member-
composition requirement is jurisdictional. The Court has 
explained that jurisdiction ―refers to a court‘s 
adjudicatory authority.‖ Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 
130 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2010) (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 
540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004)). Subject-matter jurisdiction 
―refers to ‗the courts‘ statutory or constitutional power to 
adjudicate the case.‘‖ Id. (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens 
for Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (emphasis in 
original)).  
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Although these statements refer to Article III 
courts, jurisdictional issues are just as important for 
administrative adjudicative bodies. ―It is well settled that 
an administrative agency,‖ like an Article III court, ―is a 
tribunal of limited jurisdiction.‖ Pentheny Ltd. v. Gov’t of 
Virgin Islands, 360 F.2d 786, 790 (3d Cir. 1966). An 
administrative agency ―may exercise only the powers 
granted by the statute reposing power in it.‖ Id.; see also 
2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 282 (2013) 
(―Administrative agencies are tribunals of limited 
jurisdiction . . . . As a general rule, agencies have only 
such adjudicatory jurisdiction as is conferred on them by 
statute.‖). These powers are limited by the scope of the 
jurisdictional statute in the same way that a federal 
court‘s powers are limited by the Constitution and 
statute. Compare 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 
282, with Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 
545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005) (―The district courts of the 
United States, as we have said many times, are ‗courts of 
limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power 
authorized by Constitution and statute.‘‖ (quoting 
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 
375, 377 (1994))). The fact that this case deals with an 
administrative agency does not eliminate the requirement 
that a delegee group satisfy all jurisdictional 
requirements before it may exercise the Board‘s powers.  
In Henderson v. Shinseki, the Supreme Court 
stated that ―a rule should not be referred to as 
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jurisdictional unless it governs a court‘s adjudicatory 
capacity, that is, its subject-matter or personal 
jurisdiction.‖ 131 S. Ct. at 1202. As noted, subject-matter 
jurisdiction is ―statutory or constitutional power to 
adjudicate the case.‖ Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89 (emphasis 
in original). Furthermore, in Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 
U.S. 500 (2006), the Supreme Court provided a ―readily 
administrable bright line‖ rule: ―If the Legislature clearly 
states that a threshold limitation on a statute‘s scope shall 
count as jurisdictional, then courts and litigants will be 
duly instructed and will not be left to wrestle with the 
issue.‖ Id. at 515–16. ―But when Congress does not rank 
a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts 
should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in 
character.‖ Id. at 516. ―Congress, of course, need not use 
magic words in order to speak clearly on this point,‖ so 
context can show that a requirement is jurisdictional. 
Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1203. 
The Supreme Court‘s recent decision in New 
Process Steel indicates that § 153(b)‘s three-member-
composition requirement is jurisdictional. In that case, 
the Board had delegated its power to a three-member 
delegee group. Three days after the delegation became 
effective, the term expired for one of the three members 
of the delegated group. This left the group with only two 
members. 130 S. Ct. at 2638–39. The Supreme Court 
held that § 153(b)‘s three-member-composition 
requirement meant that the ―two remaining Board 
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members cannot exercise‖ the authority of the Board. Id. 
at 2638, 2644 (―We thus hold that the delegation clause 
requires that a delegee group maintain a membership of 
three in order to exercise the delegated authority of the 
Board.‖). The presence of three Board members in a 
delegee group is a necessary condition for the Board to 
exercise its power to adjudicate a matter before it. 
New Process Steel renders the three-member-
composition requirement ―a threshold limitation‖ on the 
scope of the power delegated to the Board by the NLRA: 
the Board cannot exercise its power through a delegee 
group if that group has fewer than three members. This 
statutory mandate is therefore jurisdictional. See 
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 (explaining that ―threshold 
limitation[s] on a statute‘s scope‖ imposed by Congress 
are jurisdictional); Teamsters Local Union No. 523, 624 
F.3d at 1322 (holding that a ―two-member NLRB group 
that issued the order in this case lacked statutory 
authority to act‖ (emphasis added)). By explaining that 
three members are required ―in order to exercise the 
delegated authority of the Board,‖ New Process Steel, 
130 S. Ct. at 2644, the Supreme Court has in essence 
declared that the three-member-composition requirement 
goes directly to the board‘s ―power to hear a case,‖ which 
is exactly what jurisdictional questions relate to. United 
States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002); see also Noel 
Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2013) 
(―[T]he objections before us concerning lack of a quorum 
 17 
 
raise questions that go to the very power of the Board to 
act.‖).2 
The Board relies on three cases
3
 as authority 
providing that ―a claim that a federal officer was 
                                                 
2
 The D.C. Circuit appears to have conflated the quorum 
requirement with the three-member-composition 
requirement. See generally Noel Canning, 705 F.3d 
at 490 (discussing challenge as one based on the quorum 
requirement); id. at 499 (stating that New Process Steel 
―holds that the Board cannot act without a quorum of 
three members‖ and ―[i]t is undisputed that the Board 
must have a quorum of three in order to take action‖). 
Notwithstanding the semantics, the substance of the D.C. 
Circuit‘s conclusion was that when less than three 
members purport to exercise the adjudicative authority of 
the Board, it ―raise[s] questions that go to the very power 
of the Board to act.‖ Id. at 497. We agree. 
3
 The Board also argues that Vermont Agency of Natural 
Resources v. United States, 529 U.S. 765 (2000), 
describes the Appointments Clause as nonjurisdictional. 
Id. at 778 n.8. That case, however, states no such thing. 
Instead, it illustrates the very point we make here. It 
describes the question in which the appointments issue 
arose, rather than the Appointments Clause itself, as 
nonjurisdictional. Id. (stating that ―the validity of qui tam 
suits‖ is not ―a jurisdictional issue‖). And because that 
question was nonjurisdictional, the appointments issue 
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appointed unconstitutionally is not a jurisdictional 
challenge.‖ NLRB Ltr. Br. at 2 (Feb. 28, 2013) (citing 
Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 
868 (1991); Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Copyright 
Royalty Bd., 574 F.3d 748 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Evans v. 
Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) 
(emphasis in original). These cases hold that 
Appointments Clause challenges are nonjurisdictional 
when brought independently. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878–
79; Intercollegiate Broad. Sys., 574 F.3d at 755–56; 
Evans, 387 F.3d at 1222 n.1. Those holdings are not 
relevant to the jurisdictional conclusion we reach today. 
We do not hold that challenges under the Appointments 
or Recess Appointments Clauses are jurisdictional. We 
instead hold that the NLRA‘s three-member-composition 
requirement is jurisdictional and must be met before the 
Board can exercise its power over a case. Because this 
requirement is jurisdictional, any reason for which the 
delegee group consists of fewer than three members—
including whether one member is invalidly appointed 
                                                                                                             
within the question was not treated as jurisdictional. See 
id. Our conclusion in relation to the three-member-
composition requirement for delegee groups is the 
opposite: it is jurisdictional. Accordingly, the 
appointments issue here must be treated as jurisdictional 
because it is one reason that there may not have been 
three members.  
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under the Recess Appointments Clause—can be raised by 
a party or by this Court at any point in litigation as a 
jurisdictional defect. See Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202.  
The jurisdictional nature of the three-member-
composition requirement is especially important in this 
case because it requires us to analyze whether Craig 
Becker—one of the three-member delegee group that 
decided the August 26 Order—held a valid appointment 
under the Recess Appointments Clause. This question is 
distinct from the recess-appointments question initially 
briefed by the parties. The parties‘ briefs address whether 
Richard Griffin and Sharon Block—who were members 
of the delegee group that decided the March 15 and 
March 27 Reconsideration Orders—were invalidly recess 
appointed because their January 9, 2012 appointments 
were made while the Senate was holding so-called pro 
forma sessions.
4
 Member Becker was not appointed 
when the Senate was holding pro forma sessions but, 
instead, was appointed on March 27, 2010, one day after 
the Senate ―adjourn[ed]‖ for two weeks. 156 Cong. Rec. 
S2180 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Kaufman) (reporting Senator Ted Kaufman‘s motion for 
and the Senate‘s unanimous consent of the body being 
―adjourned until Monday April 12, 2010 at 2 p.m.‖). As 
will be seen in Part V, this means that our consideration 
                                                 
4
 The characteristics of pro forma sessions are described 
in Part V. 
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of Member Becker‘s appointment entails evaluation of at 
least one more definition of ―recess‖ than the evaluation 
of Members Griffin and Block‘s appointments. Before 
delving into the difficult constitutional task of defining 
―recess,‖ however, we must first address two preliminary 
questions: whether the delegee group that issued the 
August 26 Order lacked three members as a result of 
Chairman Liebman‘s resignation and whether the 
definition of recess is a nonjusticiable political question. 
III 
 ―We have a longstanding practice of avoiding 
constitutional questions in cases where we can reach a 
decision upon other grounds.‖ Egolf v. Witmer, 526 F.3d 
104, 109 (3d Cir. 2008). That practice leads us first to 
consider New Vista‘s  nonconstitutional argument that 
the August 26 Order was issued by a delegee group of 
fewer than three members. New Vista contends that one 
of the three members resigned before the order was 
issued. The delegee group that issued the order consisted 
of Chairman Liebman, Member Becker, and Member 
Hayes. The face of the order is dated August 26, 2011. 
New Vista Nursing & Rehab., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 69 (Aug. 
26, 2011). The Board docket also reflects August 26, 
2011 as the date that the order was issued. New Vista 
Nursing & Rehab., NLRB No. 22-CA-029988 (Aug. 26, 
2011), http://www.nlrb.gov/case/22-CA-029988. On 
August 27, Chairman Liebman resigned. New Vista 
argues that the order was actually entered after Liebman 
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resigned because the order ―was mailed, received by the 
Regional Board Agent, and was posted on the Board‘s 
Summary of Decisions Website on August 31, 2012.‖ 
Pet‘r‘s Br. at 31. The Board does not dispute that the 
order was mailed to interested parties after August 27 but 
contends that the order was issued on August 26—the 
date that appears on the face of the order. 
―Agency action is entitled to a presumption of 
regularity.‖ Frisby v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
755 F.2d 1052, 1055 (3d Cir. 1985). ―Acts done by a 
public officer which presuppose the existence of other 
acts to make them legally operative, are presumptive 
proofs of the latter.‖ R.H. Stearns Co. of Boston, Mass. v. 
United States, 291 U.S. 54, 63 (1934). Here, the act done 
was the issuance of the August 26 Order, which 
presupposes that the members listed as having made the 
decision did in fact make that decision. The issuance of 
the order creates a presumption that all three members 
listed on the order decided it. See id. It is New Vista‘s 
burden to rebut that presumption. 
New Vista offers only a single piece of evidence in 
rebuttal: that the order was not mailed until after August 
26. This is insufficient, and Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil 
Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967), 
demonstrates why that is so. In that case, Braniff Airways 
argued that the Civil Aeronautics Board lacked a quorum 
because one of its members had resigned before the order 
was issued. Id. at 459. The order in that case was issued 
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on June 1, the same day the member in question resigned. 
The Court found that the Board had a quorum solely on 
the basis that the order ―on its face indicated that it was 
concurred in and signed on June 1, 1965.‖ Id. The Court 
reached that conclusion despite payroll records with 
conflicting accounts, one of which showed that the 
member was on the payroll only through May 31, 1965. 
Id. Notably, the Court also discounted that the order ―was 
not served until June 2,‖ on the basis that ―[i]n [their] 
view it is plain that once all members have voted on an 
award and caused it to be issued the order is not nullified 
because of incapacity, intervening before the ministerial 
act of service, of a member needed for a quorum.‖ Id. 
(emphasis added).  
The D.C. Circuit‘s reasoning is equally persuasive 
here. The only evidence New Vista puts forth is that the 
order was mailed after it was dated and posted on the 
docket. This falls short even of what Braniff Airways 
presented. It relied not only on a delay in service but also 
on payroll records. New Vista presents even weaker 
grounds to doubt the order‘s date than Braniff offered the 
D.C. Circuit. New Vista cannot overcome the 
presumption of regularity. 
New Vista also argues that it is entitled to seek 
further discovery into when the members voted on the 
August 26 Order. The company acknowledges, however, 
that ―the NLRB may not be required to enter for the 
record the time, place, and content of their deliberations,‖ 
 23 
 
Pet‘r‘s Br. at 53, and the Board has stated that the 
minutes sought do not exist, Resp. Br. at 29. Yet New 
Vista persists, asserting ―that the record of the time of 
their votes on agency actions under review is essential to 
determine‖ the validity of the August 26 Order. Pet‘r‘s 
Br. at 53. The company fails to explain why the date 
listed on the order itself is not evidence ―of the time of 
their vote.‖ Absent a reason to doubt the date listed, the 
presumption of regularity requires that we consider the 
date as the record of when the delegee group caused the 
opinion to be issued, which presupposes that they voted 
on or before that date. Accordingly, New Vista has failed 
to show that one of the members resigned prior to the 
issuance of the August 26 Order.  
IV 
The amicus argues that we should decline to define 
the word ―recess‖ within the Recess Appointments 
Clause because it is a nonjusticiable political question. 
―Questions of justiciability are distinct from questions of 
jurisdiction, and a court with jurisdiction over a claim 
should nonetheless decline to adjudicate it if it is not 
justiciable.‖ Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative, 
456 F.3d 363, 376 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Baker v. Carr, 
396 U.S. 186, 198 (1962)). An issue presents a 
nonjusticiable political question when one of the 
following characteristics is ―inextricable from the case‖: 
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a textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate 
political department; or a lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for 
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a 
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the 
impossibility of a court's undertaking 
independent resolution without expressing 
lack of the respect due coordinate branches 
of government; or an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made; or the potentiality of 
embarrassment from multifarious 
pronouncements by various departments on 
one question. 
Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. Amicus‘s principal contentions 
are that the recess-appointments claim by New Vista is 
nonjusticiable because (1) ―‗the issue is textually 
committed‘ to the president,‖ Amicus Br. at 4 (quoting 
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993)), and 
(2) there are ―no ‗manageable standards‘ to solve the 
partisan argument between the Executive and Congress 
. . . regarding dysfunctional Senate confirmation 
processes,‖ id.5 Neither argument is persuasive. 
                                                 
5
 The amicus also briefly refers to two other bases for 
concluding this is a political question: that (1) resolving 
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Nothing in the language of the Recess 
Appointments Clause textually commits to the president 
                                                                                                             
the issue is impossible ―‗without expressing lack of the 
respect due coordinate branches of government,‘‖ id. at 5 
(quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217), and (2) ―the nation‘s 
extreme need for finality in the president‘s recess 
appointment practice,‖ id. (emphasis in original). Neither 
is persuasive. Defining recess in the Recess 
Appointments Clause does not express a lack of respect 
for coordinate branches of government because defining 
the word is merely an exercise of our judicial authority 
―to say what the law is,‖ which sometimes requires an 
evaluation of whether one branch is aggrandizing its 
power at another‘s expense. See Zivotosky v. Clinton, 132 
S. Ct. 1421, 1427–28 (2012); see also Nixon v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753–54 (1982) (explaining, 
when discussing appropriate exercise of judicial review 
of executive action, that  ―[w]hen judicial action is 
needed to serve broad public interest—as when the Court 
acts, not in derogation of the separation of powers, but to 
maintain their proper balance . . . the exercise of 
jurisdiction has been warranted‖ (citations omitted)). Nor 
is the constitutionality of the president‘s recess-
appointments practice the type of question implicating an 
extreme need for finality that would make it 
nonjusticiable. Cf. Baker, 369 U.S. at 213 (discussing the 
need for finality in the context of the president‘s war 
power to end a conflict). 
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the task of defining ―recess.‖ The Clause states that 
―[t]he President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies 
that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by 
granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of 
their next Session.‖ U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. This 
language lacks the explicit assignment of power to any 
one branch, such as the assignment found in the 
Constitution‘s Impeachment Trial Clause which states 
that ―[t]he Senate shall have the sole Power to try all 
Impeachments.‖ U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (emphasis 
added); Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228–35 (concluding that the 
explicit assignment, along with drafting history 
indicating that the assignment was intentional, meant that 
the power to try impeachments was textually committed 
to the Senate). The Recess Appointments Clause also 
does not contain an imperative to either branch to craft a 
rule regarding the meaning of recess—or, more broadly, 
when the president may use his recess appointments 
power. The Clause is thus also distinguishable from the 
Naturalization Clause‘s grant to Congress of the authority 
to ―establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization.‖ U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; New Jersey v. United States, 91 
F.3d 463, 469 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that this Clause 
represents a textual commitment to Congress).
6
 
                                                 
6
 Even Congress‘ plenary authority over immigration and 
naturalization does not render its actions in this area 
immune from judicial review under the political-question 
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Finally, the Clause does not provide unqualified 
power to either the Senate or the president that would 
suggest it makes a textual commitment to either. It limits 
the president‘s recess-appointment power by requiring 
that the Senate be in recess, and it limits the Senate‘s 
ordinary advice-and-consent power by eliminating that 
power while the Senate is in recess. The Clause thus 
cannot be read to invariably favor one branch‘s interests 
in such a way that it makes a textual commitment to one 
of them. See Freytag, 501 U.S. at 880 (―Because it 
articulates a limiting principle, the Appointments Clause 
does not always serve the Executive‘s interests.‖); Ryder 
v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (―The 
[Appointments] Clause is a bulwark against one branch 
aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch, 
but it is more: it ‗preserves another aspect of the 
Constitution‘s structural integrity by preventing the 
diffusion of the appointment power.‘‖ (quoting Freytag, 
                                                                                                             
doctrine. In INS v. Chadha, for example, the Supreme 
Court held that Congress‘ plenary authority over 
immigration did not render any challenge to that 
authority to be a nonjusticiable political question.  462 
U.S. 919, 940–41 (1983). The Court explained that ―[t]he 
plenary authority of Congress over aliens . . . is not open 
to question‖ except when it is alleged that the means 
chosen ―‗offend[s] some other constitutional restriction‘‖ 
on Congress.  Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
132 (1976)). 
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501 U.S. at 878)); The Federalist No. 76 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (explaining the Constitution‘s rejection of 
unitary power in either the president or the Senate in 
favor of one that divides power between them). 
The amicus disputes this, arguing that the Clause 
makes a textual commitment by providing the president 
―unilateral appointment authority when the Senate [is] 
unavailable to render its advisory consent vote.‖ Amicus 
Br. at 12. This argument reveals the tendency of the 
political-question doctrine ―to obscure the need for case 
by case inquiry.‖ Gross, 456 F.3d at 377–78 (quoting 
Baker, 369 U.S. at 210–11). We have cautioned against 
this tendency, instructing that our inquiry must ―avoid 
‗resolution by any semantic cataloguing,‘‖ and must 
instead ―undertake a ‗discriminating inquiry into the 
precise facts and posture of the particular case.‘‖ Id. 
(quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217). The amicus‘s argument 
runs afoul of our instruction because it merges the issue 
present in this case (when the president can use his 
recess-appointments power) with an issue not in this case 
(how the president can use that power). The amicus‘s 
characterization of the power speaks to both issues: it 
states how the president can use his recess-appointment 
power (―unilateral authority‖) and assumes the answer to 
the question in this case of when he can use that power 
(―when the Senate [is] unavailable to render its advisory 
consent vote‖). The greater power the president has 
during a recess does not shed light on what the word 
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―recess‖ means or who decides what it does mean and 
thus does not provide a reason to conclude that the 
Clause makes a textual commitment to the president. Cf. 
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940–41 (1983) (explaining 
that Congress‘ plenary authority over immigration does 
not immunize it from judicial review for violations of 
other constitutional restrictions on its power committed 
while exercising that authority). 
The amicus‘s concerns regarding the lack of 
judicially manageable standards for defining ―the Recess 
of the Senate‖ are similarly unfounded. There are several 
judicially manageable standards for defining ―the Recess 
of the Senate‖ and, correspondingly, for when the 
president may use his recess-appointments power. The 
parties present two different standards: according to New 
Vista, any time after both houses have agreed to adjourn 
for more than three days, Pet‘r‘s Br. at 40–41, and 
according to the Board, any time the Senate is not 
available to conduct regular business, Resp. Br. at 44. Cf. 
Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at 1428–30 (relying on the 
―detailed legal arguments‖ provided by the parties 
regarding whether the statute at issue was constitutional 
to show the existence of judicially manageable 
standards). The D.C. Circuit has provided another: 
intersession breaks that follow adjournments sine die of 
the Senate. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 506–07. Of these 
standards, those provided by the D.C. Circuit and New 
Vista are judicially manageable because they rely on 
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regular procedures employed in the Senate and found in 
the Senate‘s record. The Board‘s more open-ended 
definition of recess might very well be unmanageable 
because it does not rely on any particular Senate 
procedure and would require judicial ―explor[ation] [of] 
communications between the Senate Minority and the 
president‖ in addition to review of the ―scheduling 
schemes of the Senate Minority and House Majority.‖ 
Amicus Br. at 20–24 (arguing, after rejecting the standard 
offered by New Vista, that the Board‘s standard is 
unmanageable). But this only cautions against selecting 
the Board‘s standard rather than showing that there are 
no judicially manageable standards available. 
Of course, if the question is framed—as the amicus 
has—as a need to derive a judicially manageable 
standard ―to resolve [ ] the underlying cycles of partisan 
confirmation obstruction payback which caused the 
NLRB vacancies,‖ Amicus Br. at 25, then there is likely 
no judicially manageable standard. See also Evans, 387 
F.3d at 1227 (rejecting as nonjusticiable an argument that 
the president unconstitutionally used the recess-
appointment power because the appointee had been 
previously rejected by the Senate and thus constituted a 
circumvention of the Senate‘s advice and consent role). 
But that is not the question we face. Instead, we must 
define the phrase ―the Recess of the Senate,‖ which is a 
question distinct from resolving the ―cycles of partisan 
confirmation obstruction payback.‖ See id. at 1224–26, 
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1227 (defining recess to include intrasession breaks 
despite holding that the political argument made was 
nonjusticiable). 
This task falls within the ―‗province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is.‘‖ 
Zivotosky, 132 S. Ct. at 1427–28 (quoting Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)). This ―duty 
will sometimes involve the ‗[r]esolution of litigation 
challenging the constitutional authority of one of the 
three branches,‘ but courts cannot avoid their 
responsibility merely ‗because the issues have political 
implications.‘‖ Id. at 1428 (quoting Chadha, 462 U.S. 
at 943) (alteration in original). Thus, ―the fact that the 
resolution of the merits of a case would have ‗significant 
political overtones does not automatically invoke the 
political question doctrine.‘‖ Khouzam v. Att’y Gen., 549 
F.3d 235, 249–50 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Chadha, 462 
U.S. at 942–43). That the issue presented here touches on 
political events of the day is not dispositive of whether 
this case presents a nonjusticiable question. Because 
there are manageable standards and because the Clause 
does not make a textual commitment to the Senate or the 
president, we hold that interpreting the phrase ―the 
Recess of the Senate‖ is a justiciable question. 
V 
 Having determined that the Recess Appointments 
question is justiciable, we now begin our analysis of the 
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recess-appointment issue. Member Becker is the only 
member of the delegee group that issued the August 26 
Order who was recess appointed and thus the only one 
whose appointment is in question. As noted, he was 
appointed during an intrasession break that began on 
March 26, 2010, and ended on April 12, 2010. This break 
lasted seventeen days and the Senate was indisputably 
not open for business. His appointment will be invalid if 
the Recess Appointments Clause does not empower 
presidents to make recess appointments during these 
types of breaks. 
The Clause provides that ―[t]he President shall 
have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen 
during the Recess of the Senate, by granting 
Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next 
Session.‖ U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. This is understood 
to allow the president to use his recess appointment 
power only ―during the Recess of the Senate,‖ thereby 
rendering the definition of recess, along with its temporal 
reach, of pivotal consequence to the controversy now 
before us. See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 499–500; 
Evans, 387 F.3d at 1224. Three possible definitions have 
been presented. The D.C. Circuit defines the term to 
mean only intersession breaks, which are ―the period 
between sessions of the Senate when the Senate is by 
definition not in session and therefore unavailable.‖ Noel 
Canning, 705 F.3d at 499–500, 506. The end of a session 
is typically demarcated by a particular type of Senate 
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adjournment—an adjournment sine die—which is the 
procedure used to end a Senate session. Id. at 512–13.7 
An intersession break is the period between an 
adjournment sine die and the start of the next session. 
David H. Carpenter et al., Cong. Research Serv., R42323, 
President Obama’s January 4, 2012, Recess 
Appointments: Legal Issues 4 n.23 (2012). 
 A second definition, one which the Eleventh 
Circuit has adopted, is that recess includes intersession 
breaks as well as some ―intrasession‖ breaks, which are 
breaks in Senate business during a session. Evans, 387 
F.3d at 1224. An intrasession break is demarked by a 
Senate adjournment of any type—other than adjournment 
sine die—and lasts until the next time the Senate 
convenes, which is set by the motion to adjourn. See, 
e.g., Cong. Rec. S2180 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2010) 
                                                 
7
 Senate practice also ends sessions automatically 
through its understanding of the Constitution‘s 
requirement that they ―shall assemble at least once in 
every year‖ in a meeting that begins ―at noon on the 3d 
day of January.‖ U.S. Const. Amend. XX. Under this 
practice, if a session of Congress has not ended by noon 
on January 3 of a given year, then the session 
automatically ends and another begins at noon of that 
day. See Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary 
Practice: For the Use of the Senate of the United States 
166 (2d ed. 1812).  
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(statement of Sen. Kaufman) (reporting Senator 
Kaufman‘s March 26, 2010 motion for and the Senate‘s 
unanimous consent of the body being ―adjourned until 
Monday April 12, 2010 at 2 p.m.‖). From 1921 until 
recently, there was a consensus that an intrasession break 
was not ―the Recess of the Senate‖ unless the break 
lasted for a non-negligible number of days. The first 
attorney general to adopt this view suggested that the 
minimum duration was ten days. 33 U.S. Op. Att‘y Gen. 
20, 24–25 (1921) (rejecting the proposition that ―an 
adjournment for 5 or even 10 days can be said to 
constitute the recess intended by the Constitution,‖ but 
advising the president that a break of 28 days is within 
the meaning of recess). All presidents, at least in practice, 
followed this ten-day minimum until January 2012. 
Carpenter et al., supra, at 15 & n.97 (stating that no 
presidents until 2012 made a recess appointment during 
an intrasession break shorter than ten days). Accordingly, 
the second definition includes only those intrasession 
breaks that last for a significant duration, which 
historically has been ten days or more.
8
 
                                                 
8
 Others have argued that a three-day break is sufficient 
to constitute ―the Recess of the Senate.‖ See, e.g., 
Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Appointments of Article III 
Judges: Three Constitutional Questions, 26 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 377, 419–21 (2005). This number is drawn from the 
Adjournments Clause, which requires the Senate and the 
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The third and final possible definition is of more 
recent vintage. In January 2012, President Barack Obama 
made several recess appointments while the Senate was 
holding pro forma sessions every three or four days. 
These sessions are considered recesses under the third 
definition. Pro forma sessions are formal meetings of the 
Senate in which usually only one Senator is present to 
convene the body briefly before adjourning it until the 
next pro forma session. Id. at 2; see also, e.g., 157 Cong. 
Rec. S8787 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2011) (statement of Sen. 
Warner) (recording Senator Mark Warner‘s convening 
and adjournment of the Senate in a span of thirty-five 
seconds). Before such sessions are held, the Senate 
agrees by unanimous consent that there will be ―no 
business conducted‖ except business that was previously 
agreed to, such as convening a new session of the Senate. 
See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. S8783–84 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 
2011) (statement of Sen. Wyden) (recording the schedule 
of pro forma sessions to be held between December 17, 
2011 and January 23, 2012). However, these consent 
agreements can, and have been, subsequently altered to 
allow initially unplanned business—including the passing 
of legislation—during a pro forma session. See, e.g., 157 
                                                                                                             
House to concur on any adjournment lasting longer than 
three days. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 4. The argument is 
that any intrasession break of less than three days is de 
minimis and thus not adequate to constitute ―the Recess 
of the Senate.‖ Hartnett, supra, at 419–20. 
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Cong. Rec. S8789 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2011) (statement of 
Sen. Reid) (obtaining unanimous consent that a bill ―be 
considered read three times and passed‖ if an identical 
version is passed by the House, which the House 
subsequently did, during a pro forma session); see also 
Carpenter et al., supra, at 18 & n.108. Importantly, these 
sessions prevent the Senate from being adjourned for 
more than three or four days at a time, which means the 
adjournment never reaches the ten-day minimum 
discussed above. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. S8784 (daily 
ed. Dec. 17, 2011) (statement of Sen. Wyden) (recording 
Senator Ron Wyden‘s motion, and the Senate‘s 
unanimous concurrence therewith, that the Senate be 
―adjourned until Tuesday, December 20, 2011, at 11 
a.m.‖); 157 Cong. Rec. S8787 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2011) 
(statement of Sen. Warner) (recording the Senate‘s 
adjournment ―until Friday, December 23, 2011, at 9:30 
a.m.‖). 
The third definition of recess, which is offered by 
the Board, allows the president to make recess 
appointments while the Senate is holding these pro forma 
sessions. The Board argues that a recess occurs when 
―the Senate is not open to conduct business‖ and thus 
unavailable to ―provid[e] advice and consent on 
nominations.‖ Resp. Br. at 44. The Board argues that this 
definition follows from Attorney General Harry 
Daugherty‘s 1921 opinion, which adopted a partially 
functionalist definition of ―the Recess of the Senate‖: 
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[T]he essential inquiry, it seems to me, is 
this: Is the adjournment of such duration that 
the members of the Senate owe no duty of 
attendance? Is its chamber empty? Is the 
Senate absent so that it can not [sic] receive 
communications from the President or 
participate as a body in making 
appointments? 
33 U.S. Op. Att‘y Gen. at 25. The Board contends that 
these criteria decide whether the Senate is open to 
conduct business and available to provide its advice and 
consent. Unlike Attorney General Daugherty‘s opinion, 
the Board appears to consider these criteria controlling in 
themselves, such that there is no requirement for a 
minimum, non-negligible period of time to pass in order 
for the Senate to be in recess.
9
 Id. 
                                                 
9
 The Board does note that if pro forma sessions are 
ignored, then more than ten days passed during the break 
in which the president recess appointed two Board 
members who sat on the March 15 and 27 delegee group. 
Resp. Br. at 46 (noting that twenty days passed between 
when the second session of the Senate was convened on 
January 3, 2012 and when the Senate held its first non–
pro forma session). This might suggest that the Board 
believes a period of time greater than ten days between 
non–pro forma sessions is still required, but such a 
contention is absent from its briefs and was not suggested 
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Based on these criteria, the Board contends that 
periods in which the Senate holds pro forma sessions 
only constitute a recess. This is because during these 
sessions, the body is neither doing business nor available 
to provide its advice and consent. This means, per the 
third definition, that these sessions do not interrupt what 
would otherwise be an intrasession break that begins with 
the adjournment before the first pro forma session and 
lasts until the next convening of the Senate in a non–pro 
forma session. 
In sum, the parties argue that ―the Recess of the 
Senate‖ has one of three meanings: (1) intersession 
breaks; (2) intersession and intrasession breaks that last a 
non-negligible period, which has historically been ten 
days (―long intrasession breaks‖ hereinafter); or (3) any 
time in which the Senate is not open for business and is 
                                                                                                             
at oral arguments when asked for limiting principles to its 
definition. Resp. Br. at 43–45 (defining recess in only 
functionalist terms), 58 (rejecting the relevance of a 
three-day requirement derived from the Adjournment 
Clause because nothing shows that it is related to the 
Recess Appointments Clause); Oral Arg. Tr. at 48:11 to 
50:1 (explaining that ―unavailability of the Senate to 
provide advice and consent‖ is the limiting principle on 
the functionalist definition of recess). 
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unavailable to provide its advice and consent.
10
 We hold 
                                                 
10
 We disagree with the dissent that the second and third 
definitions of recess should be combined into one 
―intrasession recess‖ definition. Dissenting Op. at 1–2. 
Distinguishing between these definitions provides 
necessary nuance to the analysis. First, as has been 
discussed, these two definitions have starkly different 
historical pedigrees: Until 2012, presidents and their 
attorneys general have always tied intrasession breaks to 
a non-negligible period of time. See, e.g., 33 U.S. Op. 
Att‘y Gen. at 25. In fact, the Office of Legal Counsel‘s 
2012 memorandum on President Obama‘s recess 
appointments during pro forma sessions begins by 
emphasizing that the period between the non–pro forma 
sessions was of sufficient length to be a recess. 36 Op. 
O.L.C. *4–9 (Jan. 6, 2012). The availability-based 
definitions of recess that reject any need for a fixed 
number of days to pass thus represent a significant 
departure from past practice. Combining the unavailable-
for-business definition with the long-intrasession-break 
definition glosses over important historical differences 
between the two. 
Second, as will be shown, the unavailable-for-business 
definition has significantly less support than the long-
intrasession-break definition from the historical meaning 
of ―recess‖ as well as the purpose of the Recess 
Appointments Clause. Accordingly, we reject each 
definition for somewhat different reasons. 
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that ―the Recess of the Senate‖ means only intersession 
breaks, and so we conclude that Member Becker‘s 
appointment was invalid. 
A. ―[T]he Recess of the Senate‖ 
 1. The Literal Meaning of Recess 
 When interpreting the Constitution, ―we begin 
with its text.‖ City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 
(1997). In doing so, ―we are guided by the principle that 
‗[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the 
voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal 
and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.‘‖ 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 (2008) 
(quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 
(1931)). The ―[n]ormal meaning may of course include 
an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or technical 
meanings that would not have been known to ordinary 
citizens in the founding generation.‖ Id. at 576–77. 
 The word ―recess‖ lacks a natural meaning that 
clearly identifies whether it includes only intersession 
breaks or also includes intrasession breaks, whether they 
be of a certain duration or a period of unavailability. 
Dictionaries from the time of ratification provide 
definitions that can be read to support any of these 
definitions. Samuel Johnson‘s dictionary defines recess 
to mean ―[r]etirement; retreat; withdrawing; secession‖ 
as well as ―[d]eparture‖ and ―[r]emoval to distance.‖ 
 41 
 
Samuel Johnson, 2 A Dictionary of the English Language 
469 (6th ed. 1785).
11
 All of these definitions contain 
some connotation of permanence or, at least, longevity. 
―Secession,‖ for example, means ―[t]he act of departing‖ 
or ―[t]he act of withdrawing from councils or actions.‖ 
Id. at 589; see also Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary 1121 (11th ed. 2003) (defining ―secession‖ to 
mean ―formal withdrawal from an organization‖). And 
―departure‖ is defined by Johnson to mean ―[a] going 
away,‖ the ―[d]eath; . . . the act of leaving the present 
state of existence,‖ and ―an abandoning.‖ Samuel 
Johnson, 1 A Dictionary of the English Language 568 
(6th ed. 1785); see also Merriam-Webster’s at 334 
(defining ―departure‖ to mean ―the act or an instance of 
departing,‖ ―a setting out (on a new course)‖); 1 William 
Blackstone, Commentaries *187–88 (defining one 
method of terminating parliamentary business, the 
                                                 
11
 The entire definition found in Johnson‘s dictionary is: 
1. Retirement; retreat; withdrawing; 
secession. 2. Departure. 3. Place of 
retirement; place of secrecy; private abode. 
4. Perhaps an abstract of the proceedings of 
an imperial diet. 5. Departure into privacy. 
6. Remission or suspension of any 
procedure. 7. Removal to distance. 8. 
Privacy; secrecy of abode. 9. Secret part. 
Johnson, 2 A Dictionary of the English Language at 469. 
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dissolution, as ―the civil death of the parliament‖). The 
implication of permanence supports an understanding of 
recess to mean only intersession breaks because these are 
followed by an adjournment sine die, which are 
adjournments without a set date for reconvening. And the 
implication of longevity supports the idea that recess 
includes long intrasession breaks.  
Neither of these implications is consistent with the 
Board‘s unavailable-for-business definition of recess, but 
other entries in Johnson‘s dictionary provide some 
support for that definition. Johnson‘s definition of recess 
includes ―[r]emission or suspension of any procedure.‖ 
Johnson, 2 A Dictionary of the English Language at 469. 
And, of course, words such as ―departure‖ also have less 
permanent implications than death. Johnson, 1 A 
Dictionary of the English Language at 568 (defining 
―departure‖ as ―[a] going away‖). The term ―recess,‖ by 
itself, thus lacks a literal meaning that unambiguously 
supports one of the three definitions. 
2. The Historical Use of Recess 
Importantly, though, the Constitution does not say 
only ―Recess.‖ Rather, it limits the president‘s recess-
appointments power to the ―Recess of the Senate.‖ The 
words ―of the Senate‖ provide some context for our 
analysis: parliamentary procedure at the time of 
ratification. Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 
(1993) (―[T]he meaning of a word cannot be determined 
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in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which 
it is used.‖). 
American colonial legislatures and the first Senate 
largely derived their parliamentary procedures from the 
procedures used by the English Parliament. See Henry M. 
Robert III, et al., Robert’s Rules of Order: Newly Revised 
xxxiv–xxxv (11th ed. 2011) (recounting the migration of 
English procedures to the American colonies); Thomas 
Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice: For the 
Use of the Senate of the United States (2d ed. 1812) 
(relying heavily on English precedents in providing 
procedural rules for the Senate). English parliamentary 
procedure at the time had three types of breaks: 
adjournments, which were ―continuances of the session 
from one day to another . . . and sometimes a fortnight or 
a month together‖; prorogations, which were 
―continuances of the parliament from one session to 
another‖ initiated by the king; and dissolutions, which 
were terminations of a Parliament initiated by the king‘s 
order, his death, or a length of time that necessitated new 
elections before another Parliament could be convened. 1 
William Blackstone, Commentaries *186–89; see also 
Jefferson, supra, § 51 at 164–65; Michael B. Rappaport, 
The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments 
Clause, 52 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1487, 1550–51 (2005). The 
Parliament thus had three breaks: adjournments for 
intrasession breaks and prorogations as well as 
dissolutions for intersession breaks. 
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At first blush, these three types of breaks appear to 
correspond with the three mechanisms for breaks referred 
to in our Constitution. ―Adjournment,‖ or its verbal form 
―adjourn,‖ is the same phrase the Constitution uses to 
denote day-to-day and longer breaks within sessions of 
either chamber. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 1 (allowing a 
minority of members to ―adjourn from day to day‖); id. 
art. I, § 5, cl. 4 (requiring concurrence between both 
chambers if, ―during the session of Congress,‖ they are to 
―adjourn for more than three days‖).12 The word 
―dissolution‖ does not appear in the Constitution, 
                                                 
12
 The words adjourn or adjournment appear six times in 
five clauses of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 
2 (―If any bill shall not be returned by the President 
within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have 
been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like 
manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by 
their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall 
not be a law.‖); id. at art. I, § 7, cl. 3 (―Every order, 
resolution, or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate 
and House of Representatives may be necessary (except 
on a question of adjournment) shall be presented to the 
President of the United States‖); id. at art. II, § 3 (―[The 
President] may, on extraordinary occasions, convene 
both Houses, or either of them, and in case of 
disagreement between them, with respect to the time of 
adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he 
shall think proper.‖). 
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probably because the president does not have the power 
to dissolve Congress. See id at art. II, § 3 (providing that 
the president, at most, ―may adjourn [Congress] to such 
time as he shall think proper‖ if they cannot agree on ―the 
time of adjournment‖); The Federalist No. 69 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (explaining the powers of the president and 
how they are less than those of the king and even the 
governor of New York by contrasting the president‘s 
power to ―only adjourn the national legislature‖ with the 
―British monarch[‘s]‖ power to ―prorogue or even 
dissolve the Parliament‖). But the concept of dissolution 
is still present in the Constitution: Congress is 
automatically dissolved—and any ongoing session 
ended—every two years by termination of the terms of 
one-third of Senators and all members of the House. U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; id. art. I, § 3, cls. 1–2. These 
dissolutions end a session and, following elections, begin 
another session in a new Congress, see Jefferson, supra, 
§ 51 at 166 (―A dissolution certainly closes one session; 
and the meeting of the new Congress begins another.‖)—
just as the king‘s dissolution, or the dissolution by the 
passage of time, did for the English Parliament, 1 
William Blackstone, Commentaries *189.  
In light of these parallels, it is tempting to say that 
―Recess of the Senate‖ corresponds with prorogations 
and thus must refer only to terminations of sessions and 
the intersession breaks that follow them. But this 
argument proves too much. Even though the Constitution 
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uses ―adjournment‖ to mean breaks within a session, it 
also uses the term to mean breaks between sessions. The 
Supreme Court held in the Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 
655 (1929), that ―adjournment‖ in Article I, § 7, clause 2 
of the Constitution is any break in business ―that prevents 
the President from returning the bill to the House in 
which it originated within the time allowed.‖ Id. at 680 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also U.S. Const. 
art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (providing that a bill passed by Congress 
becomes law after ten days after presentment to the 
president ―unless the Congress by their adjournment 
prevent its return‖). This definition does not distinguish 
between breaks within sessions and those between 
sessions. See id.; accord Rappaport, supra, at 1551 n.198 
(explaining that ―the Framers used the term 
‗adjournment‘ with a broader meaning than it had 
traditionally under English law‖). This means that the 
Constitution does not simply adopt ―adjournment‖ as it 
was used in Parliament and correspondingly suggests that 
―Recess of the Senate‖ is not simply prorogation by 
another name. 
Understanding the differences between prorogation 
and adjournment is helpful, however, to make sense of 
ratification-era state constitutions.
13
 Eight of these 
                                                 
13
 The dissent argues that our discussion of state 
constitutions and early American practice transforms our 
definition of recess into a technical one. Dissenting Op. 
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constitutions use the word ―recess.‖ Six contain the same 
ambiguity found in the federal Constitution.
14
 The word 
                                                                                                             
at 16–18 & n.11. These sources are, however, frequently 
relied on by the Supreme Court to decide the meaning of 
Constitution. See, e.g., Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 585–86; 
Collins v. Youngsblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (199). We, too, 
consider such reliance to be appropriate because the 
average citizen likely would have understood the 
Constitution in reference to the state constitutions and 
practices at the time.  
14
 See Del. Const. of 1776 art. 7; Md. Const. of 1776 
pt. 2, art. XIII; N.C. Const. of 1776 pt. 2, arts. XVIII–
XX; Pa. Const. of 1776 pt. 2, § 20; S.C. Const. of 1778 
arts. IX, XVIII, XXXV; Vt. Const. of 1777 ch. II, §§ 
XVII–XVIII. 
Of these provisions, the North Carolina Constitution‘s 
Recess Appointments Clause has been argued to be the 
most relevant to the federal Recess Appointments Clause 
because the federal clause is thought by some to be 
modeled after the North Carolina one. Noel Canning, 705 
F.3d at 501. The North Carolina Constitution gives the 
governor power to ―grant[] temporary commission[s]‖ of 
officers ―whose appointment[s] [were] by [the North 
Carolina] Constitution vested in the General Assembly 
. . . during their recess.‖ N.C. Const. of 1776, pt. 2, art. 
XX. Recess here is essentially used in the same manner 
that it is in the federal constitution, which limits the 
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―recess‖ in the Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
constitutions, however, includes only intersession breaks. 
See Rappaport, supra, at 1552. These constitutions have 
similar provisions that provided their respective 
governors with different powers depending on whether 
the legislature was in ―session‖ or ―in recess.‖ Mass. 
Const. of 1780, pt. 2, ch 2, § 1, art. V; N.H. Const. of 
1792 pt. 2, § L. When the legislatures were in ―session,‖ 
the governors had the power either to prorogue or to 
adjourn them. See, e.g., Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. 2, ch. 2, 
§ 1 (―The Governor . . . shall have full power and 
authority, during the session of the General Court [i.e., 
the Massachusetts legislature], to adjourn or prorogue the 
same to any time the two Houses shall desire‖). But when 
                                                                                                             
recess-appointment power to ―the Recess of the Senate.‖ 
Both constitutions thus contain the same ambiguity.  
The D.C. Circuit concluded that this ambiguity is 
clarified for the North Carolina constitution by a North 
Carolina Supreme Court decision that the D.C. Circuit 
argues implicitly distinguishes between session and 
recess. Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 501. We disagree. The 
North Carolina Supreme Court opinion is not informative 
because—as the Board argues—the question in the case 
was not the meaning of ―recess‖ but whether a recess-
appointed judge‘s court had jurisdiction to determine 
whether he was properly appointed. Beard v. Cameron, 3 
Mur. 181, 184–86 (N.C. 1819). 
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the legislatures were ―in recess,‖ the governors only had 
the power to prorogue them—or, in simpler terms, extend 
the duration of the intersession recess, see Johnson, 2 A 
Dictionary of the English Language 412 (defining 
―prorogue‖ as ―to withhold a session of parliament to a 
distant time.‖). See, e.g., Mass. Const. of 1780, pt.2, ch 2, 
§ 1 (providing the governor, ―in the recess of the said 
Court,‖ the power ―to prorogue the same from time to 
time‖). These provisions make sense only if the 
legislature is not in ―session‖ when it is ―in recess.‖ 
Otherwise, the provisions are in conflict, stating that the 
governors both had and did not have the power to 
adjourn the legislature during intrasession breaks. These 
two constitutions thus used recess to mean intersession 
breaks only.
15
 
                                                 
15
 The intersession-breaks-only definition of recess is 
also seen in a second way. As explained, the governors 
only had the power to prorogue when their respective 
legislatures were ―in recess‖; but they had the power to 
both adjourn as well as to prorogue the legislatures when 
they were in session. See Mass. Const. of 1780, pt. 2, 
ch 2, § 1, art. V; N.H. Const. of 1792 pt. 2, § L. This is 
telling because if recess included intrasession breaks as 
well as intersession breaks, then the power to adjourn 
ought to also be included. Recall that one central 
difference between adjournments and prorogations is that 
the former do not end all business such that it need be 
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There are, however, examples of state executives 
assuming that a constitutional recess includes 
intrasession breaks. Vermont and Pennsylvania‘s former 
constitutions, for example, provided their respective 
executives power to ―lay embargoes . . . in the recess of 
the house only.‖ Vt. Const. of 1777, ch. 2, § XVIII; Pa. 
Const. of 1776, pt. 2, § 20. Governors of both states 
imposed embargos during intrasession breaks,
16
 which 
                                                                                                             
started anew when the legislature reconvenes while the 
latter do end business. Jefferson, supra, at 164–65. So in 
these constitutions, while the legislatures were in session, 
the governors had the option of either ending business 
through prorogation or, through adjournment, merely 
ending their meetings but without ending their business. 
There is no obvious reason that if recess included 
intrasession breaks—after which business that was 
ongoing before the break would continue—the governors 
would lose their power to end that business. The most 
plausible explanation of the differing powers in each 
situation is that recesses were only constituted of 
intersession recesses, which made it unnecessary to 
provide the governors the power to adjourn the 
legislatures because there was no business that could be 
continued. The Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
constitutions thus used recess to mean intersession 
recesses only. 
16
 For the Vermont example, see 3 J. & Proceedings of 
the General Assemb. of the State of Vt. 235 (P.H. Gobia 
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Press 1924) (recording the Vermont Assembly‘s 
―adjourn[ment] until the second Wednesday of June‖ on 
April 16, 1781); 2 Records of the Governor and Council 
of the State of Vt. 164 (E.P. Walton ed., 1874) (recording 
the May 1781 imposition of an embargo by the 
executive). This was an intrasession break because the 
legislature had not adjourned without day, as they often 
did to end the last meeting of the year. See, e.g., 3 J. & 
Proceedings of the General Assemb. of the State of Vt. 
at 31 (adjourning on June 17, 1778 ―until his Excellency 
the Governor commands them to meet‖), 73 (adjourning 
―without day‖ on June 4, 1779); 123 (adjourning 
―without day‖ on March 16, 1780); 271 (adjourning 
―without day‖ on June 28, 1781). 
For the Pennsylvania example, see J. & Minutes of the 
Pa. Assembly 212 (1778) (recording the Pennsylvania 
House of Representatives‘ adjournment on May 25, 1778 
―to meet on the 9th day of September next‖ and its 
subsequent reconvening on August 4, 1778 pursuant to 
the summons of the ―vice-president and [s]upreme 
executive council‖); 11 Minutes of the Supreme Exec. 
Council of Pa. 544–45 (Theo Fenn & Co., 1852) 
(recording the August 1, 1778 imposition of an embargo 
by the executive). The Board has stated that this 
intrasession break lasted until September 9, 1778. This 
does not take into account the Pennsylvania House of 
Representative‘s being recalled on August 4, however. 
This discrepancy does not undermine the Board‘s general 
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suggests they understood that such breaks were included 
in the meaning of recess.  
The New Jersey governor acted similarly. He 
relied on the Senate Vacancies Clause in the federal 
Constitution to appoint a senator on December 19, 1798. 
8 Annals of Cong. 2197 (1798). Prior to the Twentieth 
Amendment, this Clause allowed state executives to 
make temporary appointments of Senators ―during the 
Recess of the Legislature of [that] State.‖ U.S. Const. art. 
I, § 3, cl. 2. His appointment of a senator on December 
19, 1798, shows that he construed recess to include 
intrasession breaks because the New Jersey General 
Assembly was in an intrasession break from November 8, 
1798, until January 16, 1799.
17
  
                                                                                                             
point that the embargo was set by the executive during an 
intrasession break because the May 25 adjournment was 
not an adjournment sine die and the August 1 embargo 
imposition is before the Assembly‘s August 4 
reconvening date.  
17
 Votes and Proceedings of the Twenty-Third General 
Assemb. of the State of N.J, 1st sitting, 64 (1798–99) 
(recording the adjournment of the New Jersey General 
Assembly); J. of Proceedings of the Legis. Council of the 
State of N.J., 23d Sess., 1st sitting 20 (1798–99) 
(recording the adjournment of the New Jersey Legislative 
Council). 
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This history shows that recess had at least two 
meanings at the time of ratification: either intersession 
breaks only or intersession breaks plus long intrasession 
breaks. The state constitutions favor the former, while the 
governors‘ actions favor the latter. To be sure, the 
executive‘s actions should be viewed with some 
skepticism because an expansive definition of recess 
served their institutional self-interest by expanding their 
powers. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. 
Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 
Yale L.J. 541, 558–59 (1994) (explaining that post-
enactment actions by the first Congress must be viewed 
cautiously because of their institutional interest in 
limiting the president‘s power). But it would be 
erroneous to reject their understanding on this basis 
alone. Nothing in the historical record affirmatively 
rejects their understanding for purposes of the federal 
Constitution.
18
 But neither is there anything affirmatively 
                                                 
18
 Besides state-executive practice, the Board also points 
to the Continental Congress‘s understanding of the 
meaning as revealed by its practices. NLRB Ltr. Br. at 6 
& n.3. Under the Articles of Confederation, the Congress 
could only convene a ―Committee of the States‖ during 
―the recess of Congress.‖ Articles of Confederation of 
1781, art. IX, para. 5; id. art. X, para 1. Such a committee 
was convened during the period that followed the 
Continental Congress‘s adjournment on June 3, 1784 
until October 30, 1784. 27 J. of Continental Congress 
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establishing that it adopted this definition of recess in lieu 
of the definition found in the Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire constitutions. Standing alone, ―Recess of the 
Senate‖ is thus ambiguous. Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & 
Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2010) (―Words or 
provisions are ambiguous when ‗they are reasonably 
susceptible of different interpretations.‘‖ (quoting 
Dobrek v. Phelan, 419 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2005))). 
Importantly, though, neither of these possibilities 
is similar to the unavailable-for-business definition put 
forth by the Board. Every example discussed thus far has 
two common characteristics. First, each break lasted for a 
considerable period of time. The intrasession breaks in 
                                                                                                             
555 (1784). That this adjournment was until a fixed date 
suggests that the period after ought to have been an 
intrasession break because it was not an adjournment sine 
die, which would be denoted by the absence of a fixed 
reconvening date. Subsequent proceedings, however, call 
this understanding into question because the Continental 
Congress‘s journal does not record their reconvening on 
October 30 but instead shows them convening when the 
Articles of Confederation required they meet again, 28 J. 
of Continental Congress 639–41 (1784) (convening 
―[p]ursuant to the Articles of Confederation,‖ rather than 
pursuant to the prior adjournment), which is consistent 
with having adjourned sine die. We decline to rely on this 
practice one way or another because of the uncertainty. 
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which the governors of Vermont and Pennsylvania used 
their powers were 57 and 71 days, respectively. See 
supra note 10. And the intrasession break in which the 
New Jersey governor appointed a senator was 69 days. 
See supra note 11. As far as we are aware, the shortest 
break referred to as a recess lasted 14 days, 2 A 
Documentary History of the English Colonies in North 
America 1346–48 (Peter Force, ed., 1839), which 
conforms with the modern practice equating recess with 
breaks lasting at least 10 days. These durations suggest 
that a recess was more than the day-to-day adjournment 
of a legislature and likely held the connotation of long 
duration. This is contrary to the Board‘s current view that 
breaks in business need not be of any particular duration 
to constitute a recess.  
The second notable trait of these breaks is that the 
beginning of each was determined solely by when the 
legislature adjourned—rather than by some functionalist 
definition of when the body was unavailable for business. 
The Board has pointed to no examples of the word 
―recess‖ turning on factors such as whether members 
were required to attend, the legislative chamber was 
empty, and the body could receive messages. The 
examples instead show that recess was tied to the type, or 
possibly the duration, of the legislature‘s self-defined 
adjournment. Accord Jefferson, supra, at 51 at 165 
(explaining that Senate ―Committees may be appointed to 
sit during a recess by adjournment, but not by 
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prorogation‖). 
In short, the natural meaning of recess does not 
help us decide between intersession breaks and 
intrasession breaks of a fixed duration, but the relevant 
context does undermine the Board‘s current position.19 
                                                 
19
 The dissent refers to our reliance on state constitutions 
and contemporary interpretations of recess as a ―dubious‖ 
method of interpretation. Dissenting Op. at 20. To be 
clear, these historical examples demonstrate that the use 
of recess at the time of ratification was consistent with 
either the intersession-break definition of recess or the 
intersession-plus-long-intrasession-break definition. We 
discuss these only to show the ordinary meanings of the 
word ―recess‖ for the founding generation, as 
demonstrated by their usage. Heller, 554 U.S. at 576. We 
do not use them as conclusive evidence that recess means 
intersession breaks only, which cannot be done because 
there is not sufficient historical evidence on which 
meaning was intended in the Constitution. 
These historical practices do, however, cast doubt on the 
unavailable-for-business definition argued for by the 
Board, a version of which is adopted by the dissent. This 
is not so much because of what the practices were but 
what they were not. Namely, the Board and the dissent 
cannot point to a single example from the period of 
ratification in which a legislative body or executive 
defined recess exclusively using a functionalist definition 
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To resolve the remaining ambiguity, one might argue that 
the Constitution uses a definitive article: ―the Recess of 
the Senate.‖ The word ―the‖ might mean that the phrase 
refers to a specific thing, possibly suggesting that recess 
refers to the one recess that follows every session, an 
intersession break. See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 499–
500. But ―the‖ also can denote a particular class of 
something as well. Indeed, that is how the D.C. Circuit 
ultimately interpreted ―the Recess,‖ holding that it means 
all intersession breaks. Id. But even conceding that ―the‖ 
is meant to denote a specific class of something, there is 
nothing in the word ―the‖ itself that necessarily requires 
that class to be intersession breaks. ―[T]he Recess‖ 
might, for example, simply refer to times in which the 
Senate is in a recess. See Evans, 387 F.3d at 1224–25. 
There is nothing that shows what ―the‖ means in the 
Recess Appointments Clause, especially because the 
Constitution uses ―the‖ in several manners. See, e.g., U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 4 (providing that ―[t]he Vice 
President . . . shall be President of the Senate‖); art. I, 
§ 3, cl. 5 (providing that the Senate shall select a 
president pro tempore ―in the Absence of the Vice 
President‖). Accordingly, we are convinced that use of 
―the‖ is uninformative. We must therefore look to the 
                                                                                                             
based on availability. If such a definition of recess were a 
―normal and ordinary‖ meaning for the ―founding 
generation,‖ Heller, 554 U.S. at 576, there ought to be at 
least one example of its use from that period. 
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broader textual context in which ―the Recess of the 
Senate‖ was ratified. 
B. Textual Context 
 1. Constitutional Context and the Unavailable-for-
Business Definition 
 ―If, from the imperfection of human language, 
there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of 
any given power, it is a well settled rule, that the objects 
[i.e., the purpose] for which it was given . . . should have 
great influence on the construction.‖ Gibbons v. Ogden, 
22 U.S. 1, 188–89 (1824). The purpose of the Recess 
Appointments Clause is most evident in its relation to the 
Appointments Clause. The text and structure of the 
Constitution demonstrate that the Recess Appointments 
Clause is a secondary, or exceptional, method of 
appointing officers, while the Appointments Clause 
provides the primary, or general, method of appointment. 
The Appointments Clause provides the general rule for 
appointing officers through presidential nomination and 
senatorial advice and consent. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, 
cl. 2. The Clause lacks any limitation on when this power 
is operative—the president always has the power to fill 
vacancies through nomination and the advice and consent 
of the Senate. See id. (―[The President] shall nominate, 
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, 
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shall appoint . . .‖).20 This perpetual power stands in 
contrast to the power given to the president in the Recess 
Appointments Clause, which explicitly allows him to fill 
vacancies unilaterally only ―during the Recess of the 
Senate.‖ Id. at art. II, § 2, cl. 3. The clauses thus reveal a 
constitutional preference for divided power over the 
                                                 
20
 The Appointments Clause states in full: 
He shall have Power, by and with the 
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur; and he shall nominate, and 
by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the 
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the 
United States, whose Appointments are not 
herein otherwise provided for, and which 
shall be established by Law: but the 
Congress may by Law vest the Appointment 
of such inferior Officers, as they think 
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts 
of Law, or in the Heads of Departments. 
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 60 
 
appointments process, which is deviated from only in 
specified situations.
21
 
Alexander Hamilton echoed this understanding of 
the Constitution. He explained in Federalist 67 that the 
Appointments Clause ―declares the general mode of 
appointing officers of the United States.‖ The Federalist 
No. 67 (Alexander Hamilton). The Recess Appointments 
Clause, however, is ―nothing more than a supplement to 
the [the Appointments Clause], for the purpose of 
establishing an auxiliary method of appointment, in cases 
to which the general method was inadequate.‖ Id. 
Accordingly, the ―ordinary power of appointment is 
confined to the president and the Senate jointly, and can 
therefore only be exercised during the session of the 
Senate.‖ Id. (emphasis in original). But ―in [the Senate’s] 
recess,‖ the ―President, singly,‖ has power to make 
temporary appointments. Id. (emphasis in original). This 
deviation is necessary, Hamilton argues, because it is 
―improper to oblige this body to be continually in 
session‖ and because ―it might be necessary for the 
                                                 
21
 Besides the exception found in the Recess 
Appointments Clause, the Appointments Clause also 
creates an exception for ―inferior Officers.‖ These 
officers can be appointed either through the ordinary 
process or, if specified by statute, unilaterally by the 
President, courts, or department heads. See U.S. Const. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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public service to fill without delay.‖ Id.  
The ―main purpose‖ of the Recess Appointments 
Clause, therefore, is not—as the Eleventh Circuit held 
and the Board argues—only ―to enable the President to 
fill vacancies to assure the proper functioning of our 
government.‖ Evans, 387 F.3d at 1226. This formulation 
leaves out a crucial aspect of the Clause‘s purpose: to 
preserve the Senate‘s advice-and-consent power by 
limiting the president‘s unilateral appointment power. 
Accord Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 505 (explaining that 
the Eleventh Circuit‘s statement of the Clause‘s purpose 
―omits a crucial element of the Clause, which enables the 
president to fill vacancies only when the Senate is unable 
to provide advice and consent‖ (emphasis in original)). 
The importance of this aspect of the Clause‘s 
purpose is difficult to understate. At the time of 
ratification, skepticism in executive unilateral 
appointments power was firmly established. ―‗[T]he 
power of appointments to offices‘ was deemed ‗the most 
insidious and powerful weapon of eighteenth century 
despotism.‘‖ Freytag, 501 U.S. at 883 (quoting Gordon 
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776–
1787 79 (1969)). But the framers‘ skepticism concerning 
unilateral power was not limited to the executive. They 
also rejected unilateral legislative control of 
appointments out of concern for ―diversity of views, 
feelings, and interests, which frequently distract and warp 
the resolutions of a collective body.‖ The Federalist No. 
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76 (Alexander Hamilton). As a consequence of these 
concerns, the framers sought to ―ensure that those who 
wielded [appointments powers] were accountable to 
political force and the will of the people‖ by limiting the 
power of any one person or body. They did so by 
dividing that power between the executive and legislative 
branches. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 883–84; see also Ryder, 
515 U.S. at 182 (―The [Appointments] Clause is a 
bulwark against one branch aggrandizing its power at the 
expense of another branch, but it is more: it preserves 
another aspect of the Constitution‘s structural integrity by 
preventing the diffusion of the appointment power.‖). To 
ignore this division of power is to neglect a central 
principle that underlies the two Appointments Clauses.
22
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 The dissent understands this principle to mean that one 
purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause is ―to 
provide a check on the Senate‘s control over the 
appointment of officers by sharing the power of 
confirmation with the executive.‖ Dissenting Op. at 28. 
While we agree that the Clause is intended to preserve 
the balance of power struck in the Appointments Clause, 
we disagree that it does this by limiting the Senate‘s 
power to provide its advice and consent. The Recess 
Appointments Clause preserves the balance of power by 
limiting the instances in which the president has 
unilateral authority to appoint officers, which is 
illustrated by its explicit limitation of that power to ―the 
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Recess of the Senate.‖ Nothing in the text of the Clause 
or the historical record suggests that it is intended to be a 
type of pressure valve for when the president cannot 
obtain the Senate‘s consent, whether that be because it 
has become dysfunctional or because it rejects a 
president‘s nominations. Cf. The Federalist No. 67 
(Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that the Clause is 
needed because it is ―improper to oblige this body to be 
continually in session‖ or because ―it might be necessary 
for the public service to fill without delay‖ rather than 
because it is a necessary tool to check the Senate‘s 
power). 
Our disagreement with our dissenting colleague is rooted 
in a difference in understanding of the president‘s and the 
Senate‘s respective powers. Regarding the president, the 
dissent contends that we must interpret the president‘s 
recess-appointment power broadly because to do 
otherwise would ―eviscerat[e] his appointments 
prerogative‖ so that he may ―be able to surround himself 
with the people he believed best fit to help him fulfill his 
duty.‖ Dissenting Op. at 23–24. But the president does 
not have an ―appointments prerogative‖ or the 
constitutional right to surround himself with those he 
believes are ―best fit to help.‖ That is exactly what the 
drafters rejected when they rejected unilateral 
appointments authority in the executive. The president 
has a prerogative to nominate whomever he likes, and the 
Senate has the prerogative to reject or confirm whomever 
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And therein lies the implausibility of the 
unavailable-for-business definition. As explained above, 
the Board argues that a recess occurs any time members 
                                                                                                             
the president nominates. To construe the Recess 
Appointments Clause as providing presidents these rights 
is to promote it from an auxiliary appointments device to 
an additional one, which we know from Hamilton is 
exactly what it is not. See Federalist No. 67 (Alexander 
Hamilton). 
Regarding the Senate‘s advice-and-consent power, the 
dissent analogizes it to the president‘s veto power. 
Dissenting Op. at 21–23 & nn.14–15. This analogy is 
inaccurate. The drafters of the Constitution rejected an 
approval mechanism proposed by Madison that gave the 
Senate only the power to veto presidential nominees by a 
majority vote in favor of ―advice and consent.‖ 2 The 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 80–83 
(Max Farrand ed., 1911); see also Matthew C. 
Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal 
Executive Officers without a Senate Confirmation Vote?, 
122 Yale L.J. 940, 964–95 (2013). This means there is no 
reason to think that the balance of powers created 
through provisions of the advice-and-consent power to 
the Senate is anything like the president‘s veto power. As 
we have explained, the balance is much more equitable 
between the branches and provides each the ability to 
negate the role of the other. 
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of the Senate do not have a duty to attend, the Senate 
chamber is empty, and the Senate is unavailable to 
receive communications from the president. See Resp. 
Br. at 44–45; 33 U.S. Op. Att‘y Gen. at 21–22, 25. The 
problem with this definition is that the Senate fulfills 
these criteria whenever its members leave for the 
weekend, go home for the evening, or even take a break 
for lunch. In each of these instances, the senators have no 
duty to attend, the Senate chamber is empty, and the 
body cannot receive messages from the president. 
Defining recess in this way would eviscerate the 
divided-powers framework the two Appointments 
Clauses establish. If the Senate refused to confirm a 
president‘s nominees, then the president could 
circumvent the Senate‘s constitutional role simply by 
waiting until senators go home for the evening. The 
exception of the Recess Appointments Clause would 
swallow the rule of the Appointments Clause. 
The Board appears to recognize this difficulty with 
its definition. Oral Arg. Tr. at 48:6–9 (stating that ―[t]he 
executive branch has not claimed authority to make 
recess appointments during lunch‖). Accordingly, the 
Board argues that there is a limitation in addition to the 
three open-for-business criteria: unavailability to provide 
advice and consent. Oral Arg. Tr. at 49:15–18. But the 
Board does not clearly define unavailability in a way that 
distinguishes it from the Board‘s discussion of when the 
Senate is open for business. At times, its brief treats the 
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two requirements as one. Resp. Br. at 44 (―[T]he Clause 
authorizes appointments when the Senate is not open to 
conduct business and thus not providing advice and 
consent on nominations.‖). 
Perhaps the best indication of what the Board 
means by unavailability is its reliance on the Senate‘s 
unanimous-consent agreement that established the 
schedule for the pro forma sessions from December 20, 
2011, through January 23, 2012. This resolution provided 
that there would be ―no business conducted‖ during the 
sessions. 157 Cong. Rec. at S8783 (statement of Sen. 
Wyden). This resolution might be understood to mean 
that during the pro forma sessions the Senate was open 
for business but unavailable to provide advice and 
consent on nominations because of the body‘s prior 
agreement.  
The first problem with this argument is that the 
Senate‘s actions under the resolution reveal that it could 
have provided advice and consent during these pro forma 
sessions if it had desired to do so. On December 23, 
2011, during one of the pro forma sessions stipulated in 
the unanimous-consent agreement, the Senate passed a 
bill that provided ―a 2-month extension of the reduced 
payroll tax, unemployment insurance, TANF, and the 
Medicare payment fix.‖ 157 Cong. Rec. at S8789 
(statement of Sen. Reid). That same day, the Senate also 
―agree[d] to the request for a conference‖ from the House 
in relation to related bills passed by both chambers. Id. If 
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the Senate could pass a bill and agree to a request from 
the House to create a conference for another bill, then the 
Senate likely could have provided its advice and consent 
but chose not to—as they are entitled to under the 
Appointments Clause.
23
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 The dissent rejects this conclusion on the ground that if 
the Senate is available any time it could act on 
nominations ―if it had the desire[] to do so,‖ then the 
Senate would logically always be available. Dissenting 
Op. at 51. This misses one central feature of pro forma 
sessions: the Senate has convened. We do not hold that 
the Senate is available any time when it could confirm 
nominations if it wanted to. Instead, we are pointing out 
that the Board cannot distinguish pro forma sessions 
from ordinary sessions on the basis of the Senate‘s 
availability because during pro forma sessions the Senate 
convenes in a manner that allows it to consent to 
nominations if it desires to. This is evidenced by the 
Senate‘s passing of legislation during these sessions. 
Holding that the Senate is unavailable during these 
sessions requires a definition of availability that allows 
the counterintuitive situation in which the Senate is 
available to enact legislation while simultaneously 
unavailable to provide its advice and consent. 
The dissent suggests one possibility, which is that the 
Senate is not available to provide its advice and consent 
during pro forma sessions because ―business via 
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Besides this factual difficulty, the Board‘s limiting 
principle has another, larger problem: it still does not 
foreclose day-to-day adjournments from constituting 
                                                                                                             
unanimous consent agreement . . . is not the type of 
business that yields the advice and consent envisioned by 
the Framers.‖ Id. at 29. Underlying this is the assertion 
that advice and consent requires a vote by the Senate‘s 
members. Id. at 7. This is a complicated question. See 
Adam J. White, Toward the Framers’ Understanding of 
“Advice and Consent”: A Historical and Textual Inquiry, 
29 Harv. J.L. & Pub Pol‘y 103, 107–08, 147–48 (2005) 
(collecting sources arguing the Senate is required to act 
on nominations before analyzing the text and convention 
debates to conclude that the Senate has no obligation to 
act on presidential nominees). We are reluctant to express 
an opinion on it, especially because it has not been 
briefed.  
Assuming that a vote is required to provide the Senate‘s 
advice and consent, however, it is also the case that the 
Senate must vote to ―pass‖ a bill. See Chadha, 462 U.S. 
at 980–81 (equating pass with vote). Why unanimous-
consent agreements are sufficient to pass legislation, and 
thus constitute a vote, yet are inadequate to constitute a 
vote for the purpose of advice and consent is unclear. The 
dissent‘s definition thus suffers from the same flaw as the 
Board‘s: it cannot provide a principled method of 
defining availability. 
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recesses. The important feature of the Senate‘s 
scheduling agreement that the Board emphasizes is the 
provision that there would be ―no business conducted.‖ 
Resp. Br. at 45–47; Oral Arg. Tr. at 49:21–24. This, 
however, is indistinguishable from a daily adjournment. 
At the end of the day, the Senate adjourns, which 
represents an agreement that it will do no business until it 
reconvenes the next day. In fact, when the Senate agrees 
to adjourn, it agrees that no senator can even be 
recognized to speak on the floor. See Riddick’s Senate 
Procedure: Precedents and Practices, S. Doc. No. 101-
28, at Adjournment 2 (1992) (―Once the Chair has 
announced that the Senate stands in adjournment, there is 
no recourse available to the Senator seeking recognition 
until the Senate reconvenes.‖). The only distinction is 
formalistic—day-to-day adjournments are embodied in a 
motion to adjourn (that is often unanimously agreed to) 
rather than a unanimous consent agreement—but there is 
no reason to believe that makes an actual difference 
under the Board‘s approach. Therefore, the Board‘s 
limiting principle fails to limit the meaning of recess and 
must be rejected to prevent the Recess Appointment 
Clause‘s exception from swallowing the rule of divided 
power. 
Now that we have established what ―the Recess of 
the Senate‖ does not mean, we must establish what it 
does mean. The Recess Appointments Clause‘s 
preservation of the Senate‘s advice-and-consent power 
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does not help us decide between the remaining two 
possibilities because the requirement that an intrasession 
break last a certain duration would prevent the exception 
from swallowing the rule. We must therefore look to 
provisions of the Constitution. 
Several constitutional provisions appear relevant to 
our analysis, such as those that use the word 
―adjournment.‖ See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 500. 
Adjournment, as discussed above, is an instance in which 
Congress or one of its chambers takes a break of any type 
or length. See, e.g., Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 680 
(interpreting ―adjournment‖ in the Pocket Veto Clause to 
include both types of breaks). Thus, if the framers had 
intended for the president to be able to appoint officers 
during intrasession breaks, then the Recess Appointments 
Clause could have been worded differently, allowing 
recess appointments ―during the Adjournment of the 
Senate.‖ See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 500, 505–06. 
Because the Constitution uses recess instead of 
adjournment, we presume that recess has a meaning 
different from adjournment. Kelo v. City of New London, 
Connecticut, 545 U.S. 469, 496 (2005) (―When 
interpreting the Constitution, we begin with the 
unremarkable presumption that every word in the 
document has independent meaning, ‗that no word was 
unnecessarily used, or needlessly added.‘‖) (quoting 
Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 588 (1938)).  
That the words have different meanings, however, 
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does not necessarily tell us what those meanings are and 
whether they might overlap. The Eleventh and D.C. 
Circuits provide two different possibilities. On the one 
hand, adjournment could mean the act of adjourning (i.e., 
ending business) for any period of time, while recess 
could refer to the period of time that follows an 
adjournment. Evans, 387 F.3d at 1225. On the other 
hand, adjournment could again mean the act of 
adjourning for any period of time, while recess might 
refer to breaks of a more limited nature—whether that be 
limited by the duration of the break or the type of break. 
Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 500. In both instances, 
adjournment and recess have different meanings but 
nothing about the dichotomy between the words tells us 
which meaning was intended. 
When these possibilities are considered in light of 
the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, 
however, the dichotomy must be that adjournment results 
in more breaks than recess does. If the Eleventh Circuit is 
correct that the sole reason for using recess instead of 
adjournment was to recognize a difference between the 
act of adjourning and the period that follows, then recess 
would mean any break in Senate business regardless of 
the break‘s length. This is a broad definition that no one, 
including the Board, adopts because it would result in the 
exception swallowing the rule. So the dichotomy does 
reveal that recess must mean something narrower than 
any break that follows an adjournment. 
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But what this narrower definition is cannot be 
derived from the dichotomy between adjournment and 
recess alone. Nothing about the words tells us whether 
recess is limited by the duration of the break (as the 
intrasession definition does) or by the type of break (as 
the intersession definition does). Contra Noel Canning, 
705 F.3d at 500, 505–06 (using the dichotomy plus the 
fact that recess is preceded by ―the‖ as support for its 
conclusion that ―the Recess‖ must mean intersession 
breaks only). The dichotomy between adjournment and 
recess therefore leaves us in the same place as the Recess 
Appointments Clause‘s purpose: rejecting an all inclusive 
definition of recess but without a basis to decide between 
the intersession definition and the intersession-plus-long-
intrasession-breaks definition. 
2. Constitutional Context and the Remaining 
Definitions 
We resolve this uncertainty by first noting what is 
absent in the Constitution: a link between ―the Recess of 
the Senate‖ and any particular length of time. Attorney 
General Daugherty, who first suggested a minimum 
duration of ten days, did not tie this duration to any 
constitutional provision. See 33 U.S. Op. Att‘y Gen. 
at 24–25 (―Nor do I think an adjournment for 5 or even 
10 days can be said to constitute the recess intended by 
the Constitution.‖). Some have tried to tie the duration to 
the Adjournment Clause, which requires either chamber 
of Congress to obtain the consent of the other to adjourn 
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for more than three days, U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 4.
24
 
See, e.g., 33 U.S. Op. Att‘y gen. at 24–25 (invoking the 
Adjournment Clause to reject the idea that two days may 
constitute a recess); Edward A. Hartnett, Recess 
Appointments of Article III Judges: Three Constitutional 
Questions, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 377, 419–21 (2005). The 
argument is that the Adjournment Clause provides a 
measure of what constitutes a de minimis break—one that 
should be read into the Recess Appointments Clause to 
prevent the exception from swallowing the rule. See 
Hartnett, supra, at 419–21.25 The central error in this 
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 The Clause states: 
Neither House, during the session of 
Congress, shall, without the consent of the 
other, adjourn for more than three days, nor 
to any other place than that in which the two 
Houses shall be sitting. 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 4. 
25
 The Adjournment Clause may be thought to create a 
problem for the intersession definition of recess. Namely, 
by requiring that the two chambers of Congress agree on 
any adjournment lasting longer than three days, the 
Clause enables the House to prevent the Senate from 
adjourning sine die. This would be problematic for the 
intersession definition because, as the argument goes, it 
inserts the House into the appointments process even 
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argument, however, is that ―[n]othing in the text of either 
Clause, the Constitution‘s structure, or its history 
suggests a link between the Clauses.‖ Noel Canning, 705 
F.3d at 504; cf. Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 
286 U.S. 427, 433–34 (1993) (demonstrating that the 
context of individual provisions is important to deciding 
the meaning of them by explaining that the same words 
in the Constitution often have different meanings 
depending on their context). Absent some connection, 
there is no reason to believe that the Adjournment 
Clause‘s duration requirement controls the meaning of 
the Recess Appointment Clause. And beyond the 
Adjournment Clause, nothing in the Constitution 
establishes the necessary length of an intrasession break 
                                                                                                             
though the Constitution purposely excludes it from the 
process.  
The problem is eliminated, however, by Article II, § 3 of 
the Constitution. This provision allows the president to 
―adjourn both Houses‖ only ―if the two Houses cannot 
agree on a date of adjournment.‖ U.S. Const. Art. II, § 3. 
Assuming that the Supreme Court would interpret 
adjourn to be the verbal form of adjournment, which it 
has said constitutes both inter- and intra-session breaks, 
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 680, this provision allows 
the president to prevent the House from interfering in the 
appointments process if it prevents the Senate from 
adjourning for either an inter- or intra-session break. 
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that would constitute a recess.
26
 This is the most 
significant weakness of the long-break intrasession 
argument. 
Although there is no constitutional basis for any 
sort of durational limit on what constitutes ―the Recess,‖ 
the Recess Appointments Clause does contain a temporal 
characteristic: the Recess Appointment Clause‘s 
specification that recess-appointed officers‘ terms ―shall 
expire at the End of [the Senate‘s] next Session.‖ U.S. 
Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 3. A session of the Senate, everyone 
agrees, begins at the Senate‘s first convening and ends 
either when the Senate adjourns sine die or automatically 
expires at noon on January 3 in any given year. Henry B. 
Hogue, Cong. Research Serv., RS21308, Recess 
Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions 1–2 & n.5 
                                                 
26
 Another possible source of a durational limitation on 
recess is the Pocket Veto Clause, which provides that a 
bill passed by Congress becomes a law if the President 
takes no action on it for ten days ―unless the Congress by 
their adjournment prevent its return.‖ U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 7, cl. 2. The ten-day-duration requirement that might be 
drawn from this fails for the same reason the three-day-
duration requirement fails in relation to the Adjournment 
Clause. Namely, the context of the Pocket Veto Clause is 
significantly different from the context of the Recess 
Appointments Clause, which means there is no reason to 
believe the former controls interpretation of the latter. 
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(2012). The expiration of these officers‘ terms at the end 
of the next session implies that their appointments were 
made during a period between sessions.  
This implication follows from the reason for 
making recess appointments expire at the end of the 
―next Session.‖ As discussed, the Recess Appointment 
Clause provides an ―auxiliary‖ method of appointing 
officers. The Federalist No. 67 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(explaining that the Clause is ―nothing more than a 
supplement to the [Appointments Clause]‖ that 
―establish[es] an auxiliary method of appointment, in 
cases to which the general method is inadequate‖). The 
durational provision maintains this by limiting recess 
appointees‘ terms to last for only the time needed for the 
president and the Senate to have the opportunity to 
undergo the normal process. As Justice Joseph Story 
explained, the Clause authorizes the president ―to make 
temporary appointments during the recess, which should 
expire, when the senate should have had an opportunity 
to act on the subject.‖ 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on 
the Constitution of the United States § 1551 at 410 
(1833) (emphasis added). Limiting the duration to a 
single opportunity follows from the auxiliary nature of 
the Clause. After all, the Senate‘s decision not to act on a 
nomination effectively is a rejection of that nomination, 
as evidenced by the Senate‘s routine return to the 
president of nominations who have not been acted on. 
Standing Rules of the Senate XXXI, para. 6 
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(―Nominations neither confirmed nor rejected during the 
session at which they are made shall not be acted upon at 
any succeeding session without being again made to the 
Senate by the President.‖). In fact, a system in which 
Senate silence would allow for the appointment of 
officers was explicitly rejected at the drafting convention. 
2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 80–
83 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); see also Adam J. White, 
Toward the Framers’ Understanding of “Advice and 
Consent”: A Historical and Textual Inquiry, 29 Harv. 
J.L. & Pub Pol‘y 103, 117–19 (2005) (explaining the 
drafters‘ rejection of a system in which only the Senate 
had the power to veto nominations); Matthew C. 
Stephenson, Can the President Appoint Principal 
Executive Officers without a Senate Confirmation Vote?, 
122 Yale L.J. 940, 964–95 (2013). The Clause‘s function 
is thus fulfilled once an opportunity for the Senate to act 
has come and gone.  
So if recess includes intrasession breaks, then we 
would expect the recess-appointment term to last only 
until the end of that session. This is because once the 
Senate returned from its break there would be an 
opportunity to undergo the normal process. Yet the 
Constitution provides that the term would last until the 
end of the next session. This suggests that the durational 
provision contemplates a meaning of recess that means 
intersession breaks only.  
This is best seen in the process of recess 
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appointments that results under each definition of recess. 
Under the intersession-only definition, the president 
would make a recess appointment between sessions of 
the Senate, which ensures the continued operation of the 
government even though the Senate has not considered 
the president‘s selection. Once the Senate begins its ―next 
Session‖ by reconvening, the primary appointments 
process becomes available and—because the Constitution 
requires joint appointment authority—must be 
undertaken by the Senate and the president. However, to 
allow the operation of government to continue, the 
Senate has until the end of this session to consider the 
president‘s selection and confirm or deny it. And if the 
body does not act or denies that appointment, then the 
recess appointment ends because the constitutional 
requirement of joint agreement has not been reached. 
Through this process, the Appointments Clause retains its 
primacy as the preferred constitutional method of 
appointing officers, while the Recess Appointments 
Clause retains its auxiliary role that allows the president 
to fill positions when the ordinary process is unavailable.  
Under an intrasession definition, the Clause would 
no longer have an auxiliary role. The president would 
make the recess appointment during a break within a 
Senate session. But the Senate‘s reconvening and first 
subsequent adjournment—whether that be for a long 
intrasession break or for the intersession break—would 
have no immediate effect on the recess appointment 
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because the appointment lasts until the ―next Session,‖ as 
demarked by adjournments sine die. The appointment 
would not expire until the Senate reconvened, adjourned 
sine die, reconvened, and then adjourned sine die a 
second time. Thus, the appointment would continue even 
though the opportunity to undergo the ordinary, preferred 
process had come and gone. This shows that when the 
intrasession definition of recess is combined with the 
durational provision, a fundamentally different 
relationship between the clauses is created: the 
intrasession definition makes the Recess Appointments 
Clause an additional rather than auxiliary method of 
appointing officers. 
The durational provision thus indicates that the 
most natural reading of the Clause defines recess to mean 
intersession breaks only. Cf. Weinberger v. Hynson, 
Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 631–32 (1973) 
(―It is well established that our task in interpreting 
separate provisions of a single Act is to give the Act the 
most harmonious, comprehensive meaning possible in 
light of the legislative policy and purpose.‖ (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Gustafson v. Alloyd, Inc., 513 
U.S. 561, 575 (1995) (―[A] word is known by the 
company it keeps. This rule we rely upon to avoid 
ascribing to one word a meaning so broad that it is 
inconsistent with its accompanying words‖). This is 
supported by the fact that the original Senate Vacancies 
Clause used a different durational provision: ―the next 
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Meeting.‖ U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 2, superseded by id. 
Amend. XVII.
27
 The original language shows that the 
durational provision in the Recess Appointments Clause 
could have been phrased in a manner that would have 
allowed the Senate and president only one opportunity to 
undergo the ordinary process if recess instead included 
intrasession breaks. By setting the duration to the ―next 
Meeting,‖ it becomes irrelevant what type of break the 
legislature took because once it convenes, the 
appointment expires and the legislature must act.
28
 That 
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 The Senate Vacancies Clause stated in full: 
[I]f Vacancies [in the Senate] happen by 
Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess 
of the Legislature of any State, the 
Executive thereof may make temporary 
Appointments until the next Meeting of the 
Legislature, which shall then fill such 
Vacancies. 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 2, superseded by id. Amend. 
XVII. 
28
 Correspondingly, this could mean that the break before 
that meeting—i.e., ―the Recess of the Legislature‖—did 
not necessarily have to be an intersession break. If this is 
the case, it is unlikely that recess was used in the same 
manner in the Senate Vacancies Clause as it is in the 
Recess Appointments Clause. Some words in the 
Constitution have different meanings ―according to the 
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the Clause uses ―next Session‖ rather than ―next 
Meeting‖ thus shows that recess contemplates a 
particular type of break. And, in light of the competing 
operations of the definitions, that type is the intersession 
break. 
The Board disagrees with this characterization. It 
argues that the duration provision conforms with an 
intrasession definition of recess because if recess 
appointees‘ tenures did not extend until the end of the 
next session, then the Senate would lack an opportunity 
to consider a recess appointee when an intrasession break 
coincides with the end of a session. NLRB Ltr. Br. at 12–
13. After all, if the appointment lasted until the end of the 
Senate‘s session, and the intrasession break in which he 
was appointed lasted until the end of that session, then 
the appointee‘s term would expire at the end of that break 
and the Senate would not have a chance to consider the 
appointment. So, according to the Board, fixing the 
duration to the next session might ensure that the Senate 
has an opportunity to provide its advice and consent. 
                                                                                                             
connection in which [they are] employed‖ and ―the 
character of the function‖ in which the word is found. 
Atlantic Cleaners & Dryers v. United States, 286 U.S. 
427, 433–34 (1932). The different meanings of recess 
would likely be necessary here to account for varying 
state procedures that may or may not have had formal 
sessions similar to the Senate. 
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This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. 
First, the problem arises only if one adopts an 
intrasession definition of recess. If recess is limited to 
intersession breaks, then there will never be any doubt 
that the Senate will have its single chance to weigh in: 
once it reconvenes for its next session. Avoiding this 
problem is yet another reason to define recess to mean 
intersession breaks. Cf. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 
456 U.S. 63, 71 (1982) (explaining that ―[s]tatutes should 
be interpreted to avoid untenable distinctions and 
unreasonable results whenever possible‖).  
Second, we acknowledge that the durational 
provision can be read consistently with an intrasession 
definition. But the Board‘s point does not show that the 
most natural reading of the Clause‘s duration provision 
supports this definition. Instead, it tends to show the 
opposite. We doubt that the phrase ―next Session‖ is 
intended to address an unusual situation—one that the 
drafters‘ of the Constitution were unlikely to 
contemplate. An intrasession break has extended until the 
end of one of the Senate‘s 296 completed sessions only 
once, in 1992. (And even if we were to adopt the Board‘s 
contention that pro forma sessions constitute a recess—
which we do not—then the number increases to three 
times, in 2008 and 2011).
29
 In other words, if fixing the 
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 The Official Congressional Directory records fourteen 
sessions of Congress that have ended within a day of the 
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Constitution‘s automatic termination date. See 
Congressional Directory for the 112th Congress 522–38 
(2011). This directory was completed before the end of 
the 2011 session of Congress, so the inclusion of the 
session that ended on January 3, 2012, brings the total to 
fifteen. A session automatically ended the first Monday 
of December until the Twentieth Amendment changed it 
to January 3 in 1933. U.S. Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 2; Amend. 
XX. These are the only relevant terminations of Senate 
sessions because if the Senate ends their session by 
convening and then adjourning sine die, then the Senate 
has a chance to consider nominations while they are 
convened. For example, in 2003, the Senate had an 
intrasession break that lasted from November 25 until 
December 9. 149 Cong. Rec. 31985 (Nov. 25, 2003) 
(statement of Sen. McConnell). On December 9, they 
convened and adjourned sine die. 149 Cong. Rec. 32404 
(Dec. 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Frist). The Board points 
to this as one example of a session ending before the 
Senate has the chance to consider a president‘s recess 
appointments. NLRB Ltr. Br. at 12–13. But, even though 
the recess ended on the same day the session did, when 
the Senate convened to adjourn sine die they conducted 
quite a bit of business—including the confirmation of 
fifty-two people as officers of the United States. 149 
Cong. Rec. at 32404–05. 
Only in one instance has an intrasession break ended at 
the same time that a Senate session has. See 137 Cong. 
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Rec. 36362–64 (Nov. 27, 1991 through Jan. 3, 1992) 
(recording the Senate‘s November 27, 1991 adjournment 
until January 3, 1992). Even there, however, the Senate 
still convened before the session ended and had the 
opportunity to conduct business if it had wanted to. For 
example, it received messages from the president 
regarding nominations, though it did not confirm anyone 
before adjourning sine die. See 137 Cong. Rec. at 36364. 
Two were preceded by a series of pro forma Senate 
sessions. See 157 Cong. Rec. S8783–84 (daily ed. Dec, 
17, 2011) (recording the unanimous consent agreement to 
a schedule of pro forma session); 154 Cong. Rec. 24802–
08 (Dec. 12, 2008; Dec. 12, 2008; Dec. 16, 2008; Dec. 
19, 2008; Dec. 23, 2008; Dec. 26, 2008; Dec. 30, 2008; 
Jan. 2, 2009) (holding a series of pro forma sessions from 
Dec. 13, 2008 through Jan. 2, 2009).  
Eleven were preceded by the Senate conducting business. 
See 158 Cong. Rec. S8637–68 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 2013) 
(confirming presidential nominees and completing 
business from days immediately prior before adjourning 
pursuant to the Constitution); 141 Cong. Rec. 38549–
38608 (Dec. 29, 1995; Dec. 30, 1995; Jan. 2, 1996; Jan. 
3, 1996); 116 Cong. Rec. 43999–44129, 44346–44597 
(Dec. 30, 1970; Dec. 31, 1970; Jan. 2, 1971) (adjourning 
sine die one day before the constitutional deadline of 
January 3 after completing business); 96 Cong. Rec. 
17022–17121 (Jan. 2, 1951) (same); 87 Cong. Rec. 
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duration until the Senate‘s next session (rather than the 
end of that session) is meant only to ensure the Senate 
has a chance to provide its advice and consent without 
regard to its effect on the broader framework, then the 
duration provision‘s purpose has only become important 
                                                                                                             
10138–10143 (Dec. 26, 1941; Dec. 30, 1941; Jan. 2, 
1942) (same); 86 Cong. Rec. 13997–14000, 14003–07, 
14011–46, 14058–59 (Dec. 26, 1940; Dec. 30, 1940; Jan. 
2, 1941; Jan. 3, 1941) (conducting business several days 
before the session terminated by function of the 
Constitution on January 3, 1941); 63 Cong. Rec. 440–48, 
450–52 (Dec. 2, 1922; Dec. 4, 1922) (conducting 
business on the first Monday of December, and the days 
preceding it, before adjourning sine die as required by the 
Constitution); 50 Cong. Rec. 6030–37, 6041–44, 6050–
53 (Nov. 26, 1913; Nov. 29, 1913; Dec. 1, 1913) (same); 
37 Cong. Rec. 520–25; 529–31; 542–44 (Dec. 4, 1903; 
Dec. 5, 1903; Dec. 7, 1903) (same); 6 Cong. Rec. 764–
98, 799–805, 816–17 (Nov. 30, 1877; Dec. 1, 1877; Dec. 
3, 1877) (same); 38 Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 
793–95, 802, 810–11, 816–17 (Nov. 26, 1867; Nov. 27, 
1867; Nov. 29, 1867; Dec. 2, 1867) (same). 
And one of these terminations of Congress‘s session was 
due to continued business by the House, even though the 
Senate had adjourned sine die earlier. See 125 Cong. Rec. 
37605–06 (Dec. 20, 1979) (recording the Senate‘s sine 
die adjournment on December 20, 1979).  
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one time. And even during this recent instance, the 
Senate convened before their constitutionally imposed 
deadline and could have considered nominations if they 
had chosen to do so. See 137 Cong. Rec. 36364 (Jan. 3, 
1992). The complete absence of the problem described 
by the Board in the last 225 years suggests that the 
Constitution most likely was not written with such a 
problem in mind. Cf. Marozsan v. United States, 852 
F.2d 1469, 1498 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Easterbrook, 
J., dissenting) (―The terror of extreme hypotheticals 
produces much bad law.‖). This implies that the 
durational provision was most likely written simply to 
reinforce the auxiliary nature of the Recess Appointment 
Clause by limiting recess appointees‘ terms to last only 
as long as necessary to afford the Senate one opportunity 
to undergo the ordinary process. 
 The Constitution thus shows that the more limited 
definition of recess—that is necessitated by the purpose 
of the Recess Appointments Clause and the adjournment-
recess dichotomy—includes only intersession breaks. 
Nothing within the broader context of the Constitution 
supports the Board‘s definition. As for the intersession-
plus-long-intrasession definition, although it could 
conform with the relationship between the Clauses, there 
is no constitutional basis for defining ―long‖ and the 
definition is unsupported by the other relevant 
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constitutional provisions.
30
 The relationship between the 
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 The dissent argues that our interpretation of recess 
reads the modifier ―intersession‖ into the Constitution, 
contrary to the Supreme Court‘s admonition to avoid 
doing so. Dissenting Op. at 12–14.  This misunderstands 
our reasoning. As we have shown, the ordinary meaning 
of recess could support any of the definitions asserted, 
including the intersession definition. Through analysis of 
historical usage, application of the Recess Appointment 
Clause‘s purpose, and analysis of the relevant 
constitutional context, we hold that of the ordinary 
meanings, the Constitution uses the intersession 
definition of recess. In short, we do not read 
―intersession‖ into the Constitution because—as the word 
is used in the document—―recess‖ means only 
intersession breaks.  
This method is also seen in the dissent‘s reasoning, 
which defines recess to mean when the Senate is 
unavailable to provide its advice and consent. Id. at 2. Per 
the dissent‘s logic, Judge Greenaway‘s definition would 
read the Clause to be ―the Recess of the Senate [in which 
it cannot provide its advice and consent].‖ This is best 
illustrated by the dissent‘s acknowledgement that the 
Senate recesses when it goes to lunch but that these 
recesses do not fall within ―Recess‖ as it is meant in the 
Constitution. Id. at 8–10. Adding ―in which it cannot 
provide its advice and consent‖ to the Clause is not what 
we understand the dissent to do. Instead, our colleague 
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Appointments Clauses, the duration of recess 
appointments, and the Constitution‘s use of adjournment 
elsewhere all show that ―the Recess of the Senate‖ 
includes only breaks between sessions of the Senate. 
C. Historical Practice 
Our conclusion is supported by early historical 
practice. From ratification until 1921, there was a rough 
consensus that recess appointments could be made only 
during intersession breaks. See Rappaport, supra, 
at 1572–73. Before 1867, no president made a recess 
appointment during an intrasession break of the Senate. 
Id.; Hartnett, supra, at 408–10. In 1867 and 1868, 
President Andrew Johnson made several recess 
appointments during intrasession breaks of the Senate. 
Hartnett, supra, at 408–10. His use of the appointments 
powers, however, was a cause of significant turmoil at 
the time and it served a not insignificant role in his 
eventual impeachment. Id. at 409; Rappaport, supra, 
at 1572. Accordingly, it is unclear whether President 
Johnson‘s actions were based on a consensus view of the 
Constitution. There is evidence that it was not. U.S. 
                                                                                                             
argues that recess itself means moments in which the 
Senate cannot provide advice and consent. While we 
disagree with this conclusion, both the majority opinion 
and the dissent are engaged in the same task—defining 
the word ―recess.‖ 
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Attorney General Philander Knox—the first attorney 
general to directly address the meaning of recess—
advised President Theodore Roosevelt that he could not 
make a recess appointment during intrasession breaks. 23 
U.S. Op. Att‘y Gen. 599, 604 (1901). For over one-
hundred years following ratification, recess was generally 
understood to mean intersession breaks only. 
To be sure, this practice arose when intrasession 
breaks were generally no longer than two weeks. 
Rappaport, supra, at 1572; Hartnett, supra, at 410. But 
that is no reason to discount the practice. As modern 
practice has shown, it is sometimes in the interest of 
presidents to make recess appointments during breaks as 
short as two weeks. See, e.g., Evans, 387 F.3d at 1221 
(describing President George W. Bush‘s recess 
appointment of Judge William Pryor to the Eleventh 
Circuit during an eleven-day intrasession break). That 
presidents did not assert this power for over 100 years—
despite this interest—suggests that they do not, in fact, 
have this power. Cf. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 
898, 907–08 (1997) (explaining that an absence of 
examples of Congress ―impress[ing] the state executive 
into its service . . . suggests an assumed absence of such 
power‖ (emphasis in original)); see also Noel Canning, 
705 F.3d at 502. 
Executive practice changed in 1921 when 
President Warren Harding made an intrasession recess 
appointment. Michael A. Carrier, Note, When is the 
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Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess 
Appointments Clause?, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2204, 2235 
(1994). As explained above, this act was supported by 
U.S. Attorney General Daugherty, who reversed the 
opinion offered by Attorney General Knox a mere twenty 
years earlier. 33 U.S. Op. Att‘y Gen. at 21–22. Attorney 
General Daugherty explained that ―whether the Senate 
has adjourned or recessed . . . is whether in a practical 
sense the Senate is in session so that its advice and 
consent can be obtained.‖ Id. This conclusion was based 
on a Senate Judiciary Committee report, which argued 
that practical considerations should prevent a president 
from using his recess-appointment power during 
intersession breaks that last mere seconds. Id. at 24. From 
this report, he drew the practical considerations that the 
Board urges us to adopt today, explaining that the Senate 
is not in session when its members have no duty to 
attend, the chamber is empty, and the Senate cannot 
receive communications. Id.  
Importantly, Attorney General Daugherty 
explicitly rejected the ―all recesses‖ implication of this 
test. He recognized that the practical considerations 
identified could allow presidents to use their power for 
―an adjournment for only 2 instead of 28 days‖ but 
rejected the idea that 2 days were sufficient to constitute 
a recess within the meaning of the Constitution. Id. 
at 24–25 (answering ―unhesitatingly‖ that two days did 
not amount to a recess). He explained that not ―even 10 
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days can be said to constitute the recess intended by the 
Constitution.‖ Id. at 25. As discussed above, though, this 
suggestion of ten days is not linked to any text in the 
Constitution.  
 Since issuance of Attorney General Daugherty‘s 
opinion, the executive has claimed the authority to recess 
appoint officers during intrasession breaks. Before World 
War II, however, the power was used only one other 
time. Carrier, supra, at 2211–12. After World War II, 
intrasession appointments remained relatively rare for 
some time: President Harry Truman made twenty, 
President Dwight Eisenhower made nine, President 
Richard Nixon made eight, and President Jimmy Carter 
made seventeen; but Presidents John Kennedy, Lyndon 
Johnson, and Gerald Ford made none. Id. at 2212–13. 
The practice grew dramatically under President Ronald 
Reagan, who made 73 intrasession appointments, and it 
has seen significant use ever since: President George 
H.W. Bush made 37, President Bill Clinton made 53, and 
President George W. Bush made 141; President Barack 
Obama made 26 as of January 5, 2012. Id. at 2214–15; 
Henry B. Hogue et al., Cong. Research Serv., The Noel 
Canning Decision and Recess Appointments Made from 
1981–2013 *4 (2013). Thus, it has been only over the last 
thirty years that presidents began relying so heavily on 
such recess appointments. 
 Notably, this relatively recent practice supports 
only an intrasession definition that is associated with a 
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long duration. It does not support the Board‘s 
functionalist definition. The executive has maintained 
from 1921 until 2012, at least in practice, that a certain 
number of days must pass before an intrasession 
appointment could be made. See Carpenter et al., supra, 
at 15 (―The length of the recess may be of great 
importance, as it appears that no President, at least in the 
modern era, has made an intrasession recess appointment 
during a recess of less than 10 days.‖); see also 36 Op. 
O.L.C. *1 (Jan. 6, 2012) (―This Office has consistently 
advised that a recess during a session of the Senate, at 
least if it is sufficient length, can be a ‗Recess.‘‖ 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The 
Board now seeks to abandon this limitation, which is 
completely unsupported by modern practice. 
More important, however, recent practices cannot 
alter the structural framework of the Constitution. The 
Eleventh Circuit relied on a presumption that actions by 
the president are constitutional. Evans, 387 F.3d 
at 1222.
31
 We doubt that the presumption applies in 
                                                 
31
 The Eleventh Circuit also implicitly derives this 
presumption from the framework explained by Justice 
Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See Evans, 387 F.3d 
at 1222. Evans does not discuss Youngstown, but it cites 
United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 713 (2d Cir. 
1962), as support for the presumption. Evans, 387 F.3d 
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separation-of-powers cases. In Clinton v. New York City, 
524 U.S. 417 (1998), for example, the Supreme Court 
analyzed the constitutionality of the line-item veto 
without ever expressing the need to defer to the other 
                                                                                                             
at 1222. Allocco, in turn, relies on Youngstown to defer to 
executive practice regarding the meaning of ―happens‖ in 
the Recess Appointments Clause. 305 F.2d at 713–14. 
Specifically, Allocco relied on Youngstown by using it as 
support for its interpretation of ―happen‖ since the 
Second Circuit believed its interpretation as ―‗a 
systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to 
the knowledge of the Congress and never before 
questioned,‘‖ which ―‗may be treated as a gloss on 
‗Executive Power‘ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. 
II.‘‖ Id. (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610–11). 
While we are unsure whether the executive practice 
before the Allocco Court regarding the meaning of 
―happen‖ is actually ―systematic‖ and ―unbroken,‖ we 
are sure that the executive practice regarding the meaning 
of ―the Recess of the Senate‖ is not. As discussed, the 
modern executive practice is contrary to executive 
practice before 1921 and has only become commonly 
used in the past thirty years. Furthermore, Congress has 
questioned presidents‘ practices by, for example, holding 
pro forma sessions in an effort to stop it. We consider the 
Eleventh Circuit‘s reliance on Allocco as support for a 
presumption of constitutionality in separation-of-power 
cases unpersuasive. 
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branches‘ constitutional judgments. And in Morrison v. 
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), Justice Scalia noted in his 
dissent that one could ―not find anywhere in the Court‘s 
opinion the usual, almost formulary caution that we owe 
great deference to Congress‘ view that what it has done is 
constitutional.‖ Id. at 704–05 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The 
absence of deference is also found in the Supreme 
Court‘s most recent separation-of-powers case, Free 
Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). There, the 
Court pointedly explained that ―the separation of powers 
does not depend on the views of individual Presidents, 
nor on whether ‗the encroached-upon branch approves 
the encroachment.‘‖ Id. at 3155 (quoting New York v. 
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992)). This is because 
―[t]he Constitution‘s division of power among the three 
branches is violated where one branch invades the 
territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon 
branch approves the encroachment.‖ New York, 505 U.S. 
at 182. 
 The lack of deference to executive and legislative 
judgments on these issues follows from the fact that 
―separation-of-powers jurisprudence generally focuses on 
the danger of one branch‘s aggrandizing its power at the 
expense of another branch.‖  Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878. 
Giving deference to either branch is inconsistent with this 
concern because a presumption could prevent us from 
stopping one branch from ―aggrandizing its power at the 
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expense of another branch,‖ or ensuring that ―the 
carefully defined limits on the power of each Branch‖ are 
not eroded, Chadha, 462 U.S. at 957–58. Our role as the 
―ultimate interpreter of the Constitution‖ requires that we 
ensure its structural safeguards are preserved. Baker, 369 
U.S. at 211. It is a role that cannot be shared with the 
other branches anymore than the president can share his 
veto power or Congress can share its power to override 
vetoes. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704–05 
(1974). This ―requires that [we] on occasion interpret the 
Constitution in a manner at variance with the 
construction given the document by another branch.‖ 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969). 
The Supreme Court has stated as much in respect 
to the appointments provisions of the Constitution. In 
Freytag, the Supreme Court explained that the 
Appointments Clause represents an independent restraint 
on both branches—one that does not exclusively serve 
either branch‘s interests. 501 U.S. at 880. This is equally 
true for the Recess Appointments Clause: just as ―[t]he 
structural interests protected by the Appointments Clause 
are not those of any one branch of Government but of the 
entire Republic,‖ id., the structural protections of the 
Recess Appointments Clause belong to no single branch. 
Accordingly, ―[t]he assent of the Executive to a bill 
which contains a provision contrary to the Constitution 
does not shield it from judicial review.‖ Id. (quoting 
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 942 n.13). This applies equally to 
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the legislature‘s assent to executive practice. Any 
acquiescence between the branches remains subject to the 
constraints imposed by the Constitution. There is ―no 
statute of limitations for interpreting and enforcing the 
Constitution.‖ Evans, 387 F.3d at 1237 (Barkett, J., 
dissenting). 
Furthermore, our analysis of recent practice is 
―sharpened rather than blunted by the fact that [the 
practice in question is] appearing with increasing 
frequency.‖ Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944. Our analysis has 
shown that defining recess to mean intersession plus long 
intrasession breaks is incompatible with the Constitution. 
Although this definition is consistent with one possible 
meaning of ―recess‖ in isolation, it is unsupported by the 
rest of the Constitution. The Constitution provides no 
measure of a ―long‖ duration and limits the duration of 
recess appointees‘ terms in a manner that indicates an 
intersession-only definition. This means that the current 
practice is contrary to the structural framework set out in 
the Constitution and must be held unconstitutional. 
D. Additional Considerations 
 Our conclusion that recess includes only 
intersession breaks is supported by the Supreme Court‘s 
direction that ―the doctrine of separation of powers is a 
structural safeguard‖ which has as one of ―its major 
feature[s]‖ the ―establish[ment] [of] high walls and clear 
distinctions because low walls and vague distinctions will 
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not be judicially defensible in the heat of interbranch 
conflict.‖ Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 
239 (1995) (emphasis in original). This bolsters our 
rejection of the Board‘s definition because the 
unavailable-for-business criteria are almost by definition 
a ―low wall‖ that contain ―vague distinctions‖ which will 
make them difficult for the Senate and the president to 
predictably apply. The vagueness of the Board‘s 
definition is perhaps best captured by its argument that 
the Senate is not available for business during pro forma 
sessions even though there are documented examples of 
the Senate conducting business during such sessions. Its 
definition thus falls far short of containing the ―major 
feature‖ of separation-of-powers structural safeguards.  
This is also true for the intrasession definition that 
limits recess to long breaks. This definition is not 
―judicially defensible‖ because whatever duration is 
selected as long would be based on something other than 
the Constitution. See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 
__, 130 S. Ct. 1213, 1228 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part, dissenting in part) (explaining that ―an otherwise 
arbitrary rule is not justifiable merely because it gives 
clear instruction‖). Furthermore, although an arbitrary 
number of days at first seems to erect a high wall and 
clear distinction, further review reveals that it is also 
fraught with ambiguity. For example, if we were to hold 
that an intrasession break of over ten days constitutes a 
recess, it is unclear at which point the adjournment 
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evolves into a recess. Assume the Senate initially agrees 
to adjourn for twelve days but provides the majority 
leader the power to recall the body earlier, as it often 
does. See, e.g., H. Con. Res. 307, 111th Cong. (2010) 
(providing the House of Representative‘s concurrence 
with the Senate that the latter would take a month-long 
recess starting in August 2010 that ended on September 
13, 2010 unless ―[t]he Majority Leader of the Senate . . . , 
after consultation with the Minority Leader of the Senate, 
shall notify the Members of the Senate to reassemble at 
such place and time as he may designate if, in his 
opinion, the public interest shall warrant it‖). Does this 
adjournment become a recess at the moment the Senate 
votes for the adjournment or must ten days first elapse?  
If the former, then assume the majority leader reconvenes 
the body after eight days of the adjournment. At this 
point, would a recess appointment made on the first day 
of the adjournment become invalid because it was not 
made during ―the Recess‖ of the Senate?  The 
Constitution provides no clear answer to these difficult 
questions. The long-intrasession break definition thus 
lacks the clear distinctions required by the Supreme 
Court, which means that the intersession definition is the 
only one that provides high walls and clear distinctions 
rooted in the text of the constitution. 
The Board nevertheless argues that the rule we 
adopt today creates too powerful an opportunity for 
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mischief by the Senate.
32
 The intersession definition 
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 The dissent makes a form of this argument as well, 
arguing that the intersession-break definition of recess is 
―unworkable,‖ ―not judicially manageable,‖ 
impracticable, and leads to absurd results. Dissenting Op. 
at 52–54. We disagree that the definition is unworkable, 
unmanageable, or impracticable; whether a break is 
intersession or not is a simple matter of reviewing how 
the Senate has adjourned. We also disagree that the result 
of a president‘s recess appointment being valid one day 
and not the next is absurd, id. at 53–54, because this is a 
necessary result of defining recess. The dissent‘s own 
definition, for example, would have this effect: a 
presidential recess appointment presumably would be 
valid on January 22, 2012, because the Senate did not 
convene at all on that day, see 158 Cong. Rec. S11 (Jan. 
20, 2012) (adjourning until Monday, January 23, 2012); 
but be invalid if made on January 23, 2012, because the 
Senate became available by convening for a non–pro 
forma session, 158 Cong. Rec. S13 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 
2012). Absurdity is also not clearly shown from the 
intersession-break definition‘s allowance of recess 
appointments during intersession recesses that last very 
short periods. Id. at 54. It is a result that has been rejected 
only by one 110-year-old Senate Committee Report—no 
president, court, or scholar has rejected the possibility. 
Cf. Hartnett, supra, at 406 (―All agree that recesses 
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allows the Senate to prevent the president from 
exercising his recess-appointment powers by 
manipulating the timing and the types of its 
adjournments. See NLRB Ltr. Br. at 10–11. This is true. 
But the opportunity for abuse is present under any 
possible definition of recess. Under the Board‘s 
definition, the Senate might avoid being in recess by 
stopping the practice of agreeing by unanimous consent 
that no business will be done during pro forma sessions; 
or it might alter its procedures to allow messages to be 
received during such sessions, thus making itself 
available for business under the Board‘s definition, see 
Resp. Br. at 44. And under the other intrasession 
definition, the Senate could very well adopt scheduling 
orders that prevent a break from lasting longer than 
whatever duration courts selected—as, in fact, pro forma 
sessions are designed to do. Yet the potential for abuse is 
not limited to the Senate, as presidents may also abuse 
any definition given to recess. Under the intersession 
definition, as a final example, presidents still could recess 
appoint (and indeed have so appointed
33
) officers during 
                                                                                                             
between sessions . . . give rise to the President‘s recess 
appointment power.‖). 
33
 Hartnett, supra, at 416 & nn.176–77 (describing 
President Theodore Roosevelt‘s recess appointment of 
160 officers during an intersession break that lasted mere 
seconds). 
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intersession breaks that last negligible periods of time—
the lack of a constitutional basis for selecting a long 
duration in defining intrasession breaks is just as absent 
to define intersession breaks. 
All this is to say that the potential for abuse and 
subsequent gridlock lies not in what recess means but in 
the Constitution‘s framework of divided powers. A 
division of powers demonstrates that ―[c]onvenience and 
efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the 
hallmarks—of democratic government.‖ Chadha, 462 
U.S. at 944. We, as federal judges, are not empowered to 
regulate, recommend, or comment on how the two other 
branches of the federal government should use the 
powers the Constitution allocates between them—not 
because we can-but-chose-not-to, but because we lack 
the factual record, institutional tools, and constitutional 
authority to evaluate which branch is more or less likely 
to abuse the powers given to them. We can, however, and 
indeed we must, decide what powers each branch has and 
when they may use them because ―[i]t is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is.‖ Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 
177 (1803). That is all we do today. 
VI 
 Member Becker was invalidly recess appointed to 
the Board during the March 2010 intrasession break. This 
means that the delegee group had fewer than three 
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members when it issued the August 26 Order. 
Consequently, the delegee group acted without power 
and lacked jurisdiction when it issued the order. Our 
holding makes it unnecessary to interpret the word 
―happen‖ in the Recess Appointments Clause. Accord 
Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 515 (Griffith, J., 
concurring).
34
 Furthermore, we need not address whether 
the Board‘s substantive decision was correct or whether 
the delegee groups that decided the subsequent 
reconsideration orders were properly composed. Dir., 
Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Sun Ship, 
Inc., 150 F.3d 288, 291 (3d Cir. 1998). Review of the 
reconsideration orders is also unnecessary because they 
were based on consideration of an invalid order. We will 
therefore vacate the Board‘s orders. 
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 Accordingly, we do not have to address the conflict 
between the Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits and the 
D.C. Circuit over the definition of ―happen.‖ Compare 
United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 709–12 (2d Cir. 
1962) (defining ―happen‖ to mean ―to exist‖; United 
States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1009–13 (9th Cir. 
1985) (same); Evans, 387 F.3d at 1226–27, with Noel 
Canning, 705 F.3d at 507–14 (defining ―happen‖ to mean 
―to occur‖). 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 
 The tension between the branches of our government 
reflects the brilliance and prescience of our Founding Fathers 
and is the foundation of our nation‟s democracy.  Who may 
exercise power, and under what circumstances, is often 
dependent on our branches‟ interpretation of the wording and 
meaning of the Constitution.  In this matter, the Recess 
Appointments Clause of Article II is at issue.  My colleagues 
in the Majority have determined that the recess appointment 
of Member Craig Becker on March 27, 2010 is invalid and, 
for the same reasons, would presumably find that the recess 
appointments of Members Sharon Block, Terence Flynn, and 
Robert Griffin on January 4, 2012 are likewise invalid.  The 
Majority‟s rationale undoes an appointments process that has 
successfully operated within our separation of powers regime 
for over 220 years. 
 In defining the scope of the Recess Appointments 
Clause, the critical issue is more straightforward than the 
Majority suggests: The issue is whether “the Recess” includes 
only intersession recesses (those between two regular sessions 
of Congress) or intersession recesses and intrasession recesses 
(those within a regular session of Congress).
1
  The Majority‟s 
three possible definitions of “Recess” can be distilled into one 
question: Are intrasession recesses included within the ambit 
of “the Recess”?  I would hold that “the Recess” refers to 
both intrasession and intersession recesses because the Senate 
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 No party argues that “the Recess” should be limited only to 
intrasession recesses, and neither do I.   
2 
 
can be unavailable to provide advice and consent during both.  
The availability of the Senate to provide advice and consent is 
the crux of the Recess Appointments Clause because its 
operation depends on its complementary interplay with the 
Appointments Clause, which requires that the Senate be 
available to provide advice and consent.   
 The plain meaning and structure of the text of the 
Constitution, the intent of the Framers, the purpose of the 
Recess Appointments Clause, and the tradition and practice of 
the branches of our government all demand this result.  Any 
interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause is 
incomplete without consideration of the executive power and 
the system of separation of powers devised by the Framers, 
and such consideration leads to the pragmatic conclusion that 
the President must be able to make recess appointments 
during intrasession recesses.  Since the March 27, 2010 recess 
appointment of Member Becker and the January 4, 2012 
recess appointments of Members Block, Flynn, and Griffin 
were all made during intrasession recesses, I would hold that 
each appointment was a valid exercise of the executive power 
granted to the President in the Recess Appointments Clause 
of Article II of the Constitution.
2
  I respectfully dissent.
3
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 Given the procedural posture on appeal and the Majority‟s 
holding, resolving the merits of whether New Vista‟s 
Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs) are supervisors is 
unnecessary at this time. 
3
 I also disagree with the Majority‟s conclusion that the group 
quorum requirement (what I believe the Majority refers to as 
the “three-member-composition” requirement) is 
jurisdictional.  In New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 
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I. “THE RECESS” 
A. The Text of the Constitution 
 Our examination of the Recess Appointments Clause is 
dependent on the interpretation of two words: “the Recess”.  
This examination then begs two inquiries: 1) the meaning of 
“Recess” within the Recess Appointments Clause and 2) the 
significance of “the”, a definite article, as a modifier.  
Recesses fall into two general categories, intersession and 
intrasession, and so unraveling the meaning of “Recess” 
begins and ends with resolving the intersession-intrasession 
dynamic.  The Majority posits that this dichotomy 
contemplates that intersession breaks and intrasession breaks 
are both recesses by the Senate that have contrasting effects 
on the President‟s ability to make recess appointments.  I 
disagree.   
 As a starting point in defining a “recess”, it is helpful 
to define a “session” since the two terms are related.  There 
are various types of sessions, including the “daily sessions” of 
Congress, during which it conducts its day-to-day business, as 
well as its “regular sessions”, which are the periods during 
which Congress conducts its business on a regular basis.  In 
addition to these sessions, there are also “extraordinary 
sessions” of Congress that can be called by the President 
under Article II.
4
  U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.  And, since the 
                                                                                                     
2635 (2010), the Supreme Court does not use the word 
“jurisdictional”, or any variant thereof, and did not 
characterize the § 153(b) requirement as jurisdictional. 
4
 The Majority‟s definition of an intersession recess also 
includes recesses preceding and following extraordinary and 
4 
 
House and Senate are not required to match schedules, the 
session or recess of one body may be different than that of the 
other.   
 Based on the definition of a regular session, recesses 
can be divided into the two mentioned categories of breaks, 
intersession recesses and intrasession recesses.  Intersession 
recesses are those breaks of the Senate that occur between 
two regular sessions of the Senate; they are generally initiated 
by an adjournment sine die.  See Henry B. Hogue, Cong. 
Research Serv., Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked 
Questions 1-2 (Jan. 9, 2012).  Intrasession recesses are breaks 
that occur during a regular session of the Senate.  It had been 
suggested that Congress cannot be in a recess and in a regular 
session concurrently, but the Supreme Court has rejected this 
conclusion.  Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583, 589 
(1938) (“Plainly the taking of such a recess [by one house] is 
not an adjournment by the Congress.  The „Session of 
Congress‟ continues.”); see also Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 
1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc).  From this, it is 
possible for one house to recess while the session of the 
Congress, as a joint body, continues.
5
 
                                                                                                     
special sessions of Congress, but such a holding is beyond the 
facts of our case.  See Edward A. Hartnett, Recess 
Appointments of Article III Judges: Three Constitutional 
Questions, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 377, 408 n.136, 414-15 
(2005).   
5
 For one, the regular session of the Senate does not end when 
it takes an intrasession recess.  See generally Congressional 
Directory for the 112th Congress (2011) (showing that the 
dates of intrasession recesses occur within the dates spanning 
5 
 
 To begin our textual analysis, the Recess 
Appointments Clause must be read in conjunction with the 
Appointments Clause.  While the Majority also reads these 
two clauses together, it takes a shortsighted view of their 
interrelation.  The Majority contends that the Appointments 
Clause gives the President a “perpetual” power to seek the 
advice and consent of the Senate.  (Majority Op. at 58-59.)  
The Majority also contends that the Appointments Clause 
suggests a preference for “divided power” in the 
appointments process.  I could not agree more with the 
Majority that every facet of the appointments process must 
reinforce the separation of powers, but the Majority‟s view is 
too narrow.  While the Recess Appointments Clause gives the 
President sole authority to make appointments during the 
“Recess” of the Senate, the Recess Appointments Clause 
maintains the separation of powers within the larger 
framework of the appointments process.  In The Federalist 
No. 67, which the Majority relies upon for this point, 
Alexander Hamilton emphasized that the recess appointment 
power was only a supplement to the advice and consent 
power of the Senate.  The Federalist No. 67, at 409 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  The 
Majority misinterprets Hamilton‟s point.  The supplemental 
nature of the Recess Appointments Clause helps to maintain 
the separation of powers by preventing the President from 
holding the entire power to appoint in his hands.   
                                                                                                     
the convening date and adjournment date of regular sessions 
of the Senate).  For another, the House and the Senate, as one 
Congress, generally share the same regular session and the 
recess of one body, such as the Senate, does not interrupt the 
regular session of the House and Congress as a whole.  
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 The Appointments Clause provides that a nominee 
may only be presented by the President but, on the other 
hand, may only be confirmed to office with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.  The Recess Appointments Clause 
thereafter provides an alternate means of confirming 
nominees when the Appointments Clause cannot be 
implemented, namely when the Senate cannot provide advice 
and consent to the President.  After all, the Appointments 
Clause and Recess Appointments Clause cannot both operate 
simultaneously — one means of appointment must be used or 
the other.  Thus, it can be adduced that the meaning of “the 
Recess” is the converse of when the Senate can provide 
advice and consent to the Senate: The Senate is in “the 
Recess” when it is not available to provide advice and 
consent.  See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 505 
(D.C. Cir. 2013) (observing that there is “a crucial element of 
the [Recess Appointments] Clause, which enables the 
President to fill vacancies only when the Senate is unable to 
provide advice and consent” (emphasis in original)).  Since 
the Senate can be unavailable to provide advice and consent 
during either an intrasession recess or an intersession recess, 
“the Recess” naturally encompasses both types of recesses.  
To provide advice and consent, the Senate must be able to 
offer a confirmation vote on nominees, be it up or down.
6
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 This segues to an inherent weakness in restricting “the 
Recess” to intersession recesses.  The House was largely 
responsible for the pro forma sessions because it refused to let 
the Senate take a longer recess due to the Adjournments 
Clause‟s requirement that the House and Senate have the 
other body‟s consent to “adjourn for more than three days.”  
U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl. 4; Office of Legal Counsel, 
7 
 
                                                                                                     
Lawfulness of Recess Appointments During a Recess of the 
Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. 
O.L.C. 1, 2-3 (2012).  Without doubt, the Framers did not 
intend for the House to single-handedly stall the appointments 
process.  The plain and uncontestable text of the 
Appointments Clause makes it clear that only the President 
and the Senate are to consult on appointments.  Nowhere in 
the Appointments Clause is the House mentioned.  If 
“Recess” were limited to intersession recesses, because that is 
the only time when the Senate is not in a regular session, and 
the Senate is always available to provide advice and consent 
when in a regular session, then the House would be allowed 
to inject its whims into the appointments process by limiting 
even the duration of the intersession recess.  This is because 
an adjournment of more than three days requires the 
imprimatur of the House under the Adjournments Clause.  
After all, the purpose of the Adjournments Clause is to make 
sure that one house of Congress cannot abandon the other in 
the legislative process, and the House cannot legislate with 
the Senate if it is not in session.  See Edward A. Hartnett, 
Recess Appointments of Article III Judges: Three 
Constitutional Questions, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 377, 379 
(2005).  If the Recess Appointments Clause was only 
triggered when the Senate ended a regular session, then a 
recess appointment made during an intersession recess of at 
least three days would effectively be subject to the approval 
of the House.  The House could simply deny the Senate leave 
to adjourn in order to thwart the President‟s ability to make 
recess appointments.  In at least the last thirty years, the 
President has never made a recess appointment, of either the 
intersession or intrasession variety, during a recess of less 
than ten days.  See Henry B. Hogue, Cong. Research Serv., 
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 While courts have not had occasion to articulate a 
standard for advice and consent, it is clear through the plain 
meaning of “advice and consent” that the provision of advice 
and consent cannot be perfunctory.  It is only reasonable to 
require that there must be a deliberative process (“advice”), a 
vote (“consent”), and a quorum of Senators actually present 
in the Senate chamber.  See Elizabeth Rybicki, Cong. 
Research Serv., Senate Consideration of Presidential 
Nominations: Committee and Floor Procedure 10 (July 1, 
2003) (“A majority of Senators present and voting, a quorum 
being present, is required to approve a nomination.”).  It is no 
secret that the advice and consent process is a long and 
arduous ordeal.  See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 508 (calling 
the advice and consent process “cumbersome”).  Various 
forms of “vote” are used frequently elsewhere in the 
Constitution, so the Framers would not have used “Advice 
and Consent” if they only intended for nominees to be 
confirmed by a vote.
7
   
                                                                                                     
Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions 3 (Jan. 9, 
2012).  Based on that empirical data, it is highly improbable 
that, under these circumstances, the President would make a 
recess appointment without needing the House‟s approval.  
This cannot be what the Framers intended.  See Noel 
Canning, 705 F.3d at 504 (“Without any evidence indicating 
that [the Recess Appointments Clause and Adjournments 
Clause] are related, we cannot read one as governing the 
other. We will not do violence to the Constitution by ignoring 
the Framers‟ choice of words.”). 
7
 As for a presence requirement, “presence” is not mentioned 
in the Appointments Clause but it is mentioned explicitly as a 
requirement of advice and consent in the Treaty Clause.  U.S. 
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 “Recess”, no doubt, is a malleable term because of the 
several types of breaks that the Senate takes.  As far as a 
recess is considered a break of the Senate, all recesses can be 
classified generally as adjournments, in the sense that they are 
suspensions in the business of the Senate until a further date.  
Adjournments, though, come in different species.  An 
adjournment sine die usually signifies the end of a regular 
session of Congress.  See Henry B. Hogue, Cong. Research 
Serv., Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions 1-2 
(Jan. 9, 2012).  An adjournment to a day and time certain will 
conclude the business of one legislative day until the next.  
Floyd M. Riddick & Alan S. Furman, Riddick’s Senate 
Procedure: Precedents and Practice, S. Doc. No. 101-28, at 
14 (1992) (hereinafter “Riddick‟s Senate Procedure”).  The 
Senate will also adjourn for lunch by recessing.  See, e.g., 159 
Cong. Rec. S1249 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2013) (“Under the 
previous order, the Senate stands in recess until 2 p.m.  
Thereupon, the Senate, at 12:30 p.m., recessed until 2 p.m. 
and reassembled when called to order by the Presiding 
Officer . . . .”).   
 It is telling that the Framers chose to use the term 
“Adjournment” several times elsewhere in the Constitution.  
Accordingly, there must be some reason why the Framers did 
not use “Adjournment” in the Recess Appointments Clause 
and did not use “Recess” where “Adjournment” appears.  The 
apparent and plain explanation for this distinction in 
terminology is that, elsewhere in the Constitution, 
                                                                                                     
Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by 
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur . 
. . .” (emphasis added)). 
10 
 
“Adjournment” refers to a certain species of breaks of 
Congress different from the species of breaks referred to by 
the “Recess” in the Recess Appointments Clause.  See Noel 
Canning, 705 F.3d at 500 (determining that “the Framers 
intended something specific by the term „the Recess,‟ and that 
it was something different than a generic break in 
proceedings”).   
 To illustrate, the scenarios embodied by the clauses 
that employ “Adjournment” could apply to adjournments 
between two daily sessions of Congress — perhaps the 
adjournment that occurs during the weekends of a regular 
session of Congress — whereas “Recess” would not apply to 
such an adjournment if the Senate was still available to 
provide advice and consent.  The Majority observes that the 
Supreme Court held that “Adjournment”, as used in the 
Pocket Veto Clause, could refer to any break in business.  
(Majority Op. at 45.)  It is true that “Recess” encompasses a 
narrower subcategory of breaks than “Adjournment”.  
(Majority Op. at 71 (“So the dichotomy does reveal that 
recess must mean something narrower than any break that 
follows an adjournment.”).)  But, unlike the Majority, I do not 
understand this distinction to be meaningless.  (Majority Op. 
at 71 (“But what this narrower definition is cannot be derived 
from the dichotomy between adjournment and recess 
alone.”).)   
 As a narrower species of breaks than “Adjournment”, 
“Recess” cannot reasonably be read to include every type of 
adjournment, such as the breaks the Senate takes for lunch, 
for the night between daily sessions, and over the weekends.  
See 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the 
General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787, at 409-10 
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(Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. 1836) (hereinafter “Elliott‟s 
Debates”) (statement of James Madison at the Virginia 
convention) (“There will not be occasion for the continual 
residence of the senators at the seat of government. . . . It is 
observed that the President, when vacancies happen during 
the recess of the Senate, may fill them till it meets.”). 
 In the case of the Adjournments Clause, the 
adjournment contemplated there is also different than “the 
Recess” contemplated by the Recess Appointments Clause.  
To encompass “the Recess” within the adjournment 
contemplated by the Adjournments Clause would submit the 
President‟s recess appointment power to the whims of the 
House because the House must provide its consent if the 
Senate is to adjourn for more than three days.  This is a result 
clearly antithetical to the text of the Constitution and the 
intent of the Framers.  As Hamilton admonished, the House 
was not to interfere with the appointments process because 
“[a] body so fluctuating and at the same time so numerous 
can never be deemed proper for the exercise of that power [of 
appointments].  Its unfitness will appear manifest to all when 
it is recollected that in half a century it may consist of three or 
four hundred persons.”  The Federalist No. 77, at 463 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 Our analysis must also be educated by the provident 
lesson of the Supreme Court in The Pocket Veto Case, 279 
U.S. 655 (1929), since the mechanism and construction of the 
Pocket Veto Clause closely parallels the Recess 
Appointments Clause in striking ways.
8
  The Majority relies 
                                              
8
 The Pocket Veto Case and Wright, like other cases on other 
aspects of the executive power, are not wholly applicable to 
12 
 
on The Pocket Veto Case in its analysis but misses the true 
import of that case‟s analysis.  (Majority Op. at 45, 69.)  Both 
the Pocket Veto Clause and the Recess Appointments Clause 
provide a check on Congress when it is unavailable to 
perform one of its functions by placing a procedural limit on 
the exercise of its power.  In that case, the Court considered 
whether the “ten Days” language of the Pocket Veto Clause 
included all days or just “legislative” days.  The Court refused 
to read the modifier “legislative” into the Pocket Veto Clause, 
favoring a more expansive reading of the Clause.  Id. at 679-
80.  The Court then faced a dichotomy similar to our 
intersession-intrasession divide: Whether the use of 
“Adjournment” in the Pocket Veto Clause only applied to 
final adjournments or also to interim adjournments.  Id. at 
680-81.  The Court again rejected a constricted reading of the 
Clause and favored a broader executive power, holding that 
“adjournment” could apply to either type of adjournment 
because “[t]he power thus conferred upon the President 
cannot be narrowed or cut down by Congress, nor the time 
within which it is to be exercised lessened, directly or 
indirectly.”  Id. at 677-78.   
 While the Majority focuses on why “the Recess” only 
refers to intersession recesses, there is a bald deficiency in 
these arguments.  The Majority‟s intersession limitation reads 
modifiers into the Recess Appointments Clause that are 
plainly not part of the text.
9
  These modifiers rewrite the 
                                                                                                     
our decision but both certainly provide insight and counsel 
about how we should resolve what is an analogous issue. 
9
 The Majority attempts to show that I, too, am reading a 
modifier into the Recess Appointments Clause by turning 
“the Recess” into “the Recess in which the Senate cannot 
13 
 
Constitution for the Framers.  The imperative set in The 
Pocket Veto Case, where parties attempted to read similar 
modifiers into the Constitution, chides against limiting the 
recess appointment power by inserting a modifier like 
“intersession” before “Recess” and supports including 
multiple types of recesses within the meaning of “the 
Recess”.  See 279 U.S. at 679 (“There is nothing whatever to 
justify changing this meaning by inserting the word 
„legislative‟ as a qualifying adjective.”); id. at 680 (“The 
word „adjournment‟ is not qualified by the word „final‟; and 
there is nothing in the context which warrants the insertion of 
such a limitation.”).   
 The Recess Appointments Clause does not distinguish 
between intersession and intrasession recesses.  See Evans, 
387 F.3d at 1224-25.  Accordingly, we should not read such a 
limitation onto the executive power where one has not been 
directly conferred by the Framers.  Cf. Myers v. United States, 
272 U.S. 52, 118 (1926) (reasoning that the executive power 
                                                                                                     
provide Advice and Consent”.  But there is a distinction 
between our approaches.  If my definition can be considered a 
modifier, it only reflects how the Appointments Clause 
modifies the Recess Appointments Clause.  While I limit the 
operation of the Recess Appointments Clause, as a whole, 
with another clause (the Appointments Clause), the Majority 
limits the word “Recess” with another word (the modifier).  
As opposed to the modifier that the Majority reads into the 
Constitution, the Appointments Clause already exists in the 
Constitution and is meant to modify the Recess Appointments 
Clause.  Under my definition, any type of recess — be it 
intersession or intrasession — is considered “the Recess”, so I 
do not read a new modifier onto “the Recess” itself. 
14 
 
is “limited by direct expressions where limitation was needed, 
and the fact that no express limit was placed on the power of 
removal by the executive was convincing indication that none 
was intended”).  The Recess Appointments Clause sets forth 
no exceptions defining the type of recesses that may be 
excluded, whereas the Framers provided exceptions 
elsewhere in the Constitution.  The only modifier of “Recess” 
is “the” and “the” certainly is not synonymous with 
“intersession”.  Evans, 387 F.3d at 1224.  Nor is “the” readily 
interpreted as “a single type of”, which would need to be the 
reading if “Recess” is only to refer singularly to intersession 
recesses.  Even the Majority, unlike Noel Canning, concedes 
that “the” lacks the necessary specification to limit “Recess” 
to one type of recess.
10
  (Majority Op. at 57 (observing that 
“there is nothing in the word „the‟ itself that necessarily 
requires . . . intersession breaks”).)   
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 The Majority also attempts to extract a sense of 
“permanence” and “longevity” from dictionary definitions of 
“recess” at the time of ratification, but such vague terms lack 
any real substance.  (Majority Op. at 40-41.)  Even if the 
Majority‟s qualifications, “permanence” and “longevity”, 
were persuasive, they would support recess appointments 
during long intrasession recesses and prohibit recess 
appointments during short intersession recesses. The 
longevity and permanence of a thirty-day intrasession recess 
is no less than that of a thirty-day intersession recess.  
Moreover, as the Majority admits about a similarly vague 
descriptor, “there is no constitutional basis for defining „long‟ 
and the definition is unsupported by the other relevant 
constitutional provisions.”  (Majority Op. at 86.) 
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 Framed differently, if the text of the Recess 
Appointments Clause was meant to distinguish between 
intersession and intrasession recesses, the Framers would 
have employed some other modifier not as cryptic or 
pedestrian as “the”.  If that had been their intent, the Framers 
were certainly deliberate enough to have inserted some 
modifier to indicate that “the Recess” only refers to the recess 
between regular sessions of Congress.  See Wright, 302 U.S. 
at 588 (establishing that, as an essential tenet of constitutional 
interpretation, courts must respect “„the high talent, the 
caution, and the foresight of the illustrious men who framed 
[the Constitution]‟” such that “„[e]very word appears to have 
been weighed with the utmost deliberation‟” (quoting Holmes 
v. Jennison, 39 U.S 540, 571 (1840))); United States v. 
Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 732 (1931) (describing the 
Constitution as an “instrument drawn with such meticulous 
care and by men who so well understood how to make 
language fit their thought”).   
 Consequently, it is telling that, despite that possibility, 
they chose not to include such a modifier and chose one of 
the most bland modifiers in the English language.  Also, 
congruent with the Framers‟ use of “Adjournment” to refer to 
a broader category of breaks than “Recess”, it is plausible that 
“the” as a modifier serves to emphasize that “Recess” refers 
to a definite, circumscribed class of adjournments.  As 
Hamilton assured, there is an “obvious meaning of the terms” 
in the Recess Appointments Clause.  The Federalist No. 67, at 
409 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).   
 This same point about reading modifiers into the 
Constitution applies with equal vigor to arguments that the 
length of “the Recess” should be limited to a certain number 
of days.  In relation to the durational limits of intrasession and 
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intersession recesses, the use of express day limits elsewhere 
in the Constitution suggests that the Framers deliberately 
chose not to include such a modifier in the Recess 
Appointments Clause.  In the Pocket Veto Clause, the 
Framers deliberately added a day limitation (rather than 
simply saying that a bill would not become law if it could not 
be returned to the house in which it originated).  This shows 
that the Framers could have crafted a similar day limitation 
into the Recess Appointments Clause if they had so desired.  
In addition, there are no time constraints on the Appointments 
Clause itself.  As the Majority points out, the Appointments 
Clause “lacks any limitation on when this power is operative” 
such that “the president always has the power to fill vacancies 
through nomination and the advice and consent of the 
Senate.”  (Majority Op. at 58 (emphasis in original).)  But, 
since the Recess Appointments Clause depends on when the 
Appointments Clause is not operative and similarly lacks any 
explicit limitation, there is no consistency in reading a hard 
time limit into the Recess Appointments Clause without 
reading one into the Appointments Clause.  
 The other flaw in the Majority‟s premise that “Recess” 
is restricted to intersession recesses is that it relies on a 
technical definition of “recess” rather than a plain and 
ordinary definition of “recess”.  See The Pocket Veto Case, 
279 U.S. at 679 (“The words used in the Constitution are to 
be taken in their natural and obvious sense . . . .”); see also 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-77 (2008) 
(“Normal meaning may of course include an idiomatic 
meaning, but it excludes secret or technical meanings that 
would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the 
founding generation.”).  As a document written for the people 
and meant to be accessible to every citizen, we must assume 
17 
 
that the Framers intended for words to be understood by their 
ordinary, rather than their technical, definition.  See Heller, 
554 U.S. at 576-77.  The Majority admits that “Recess” 
“lacks a natural meaning that clearly identifies whether it 
includes only intersession breaks or also includes intrasession 
breaks.”  (Majority Op. at 40.)  The logical inference from the 
Majority‟s assessment is that “Recess” lacks a natural 
limitation or natural specification.  Thus, the only way to 
delimit “Recess” to intersession recesses would be to shroud 
it in an unnatural meaning, which would not lend an obvious 
or ordinary meaning to the word.
11
 
 The narrowing of the term “Recess” by the Majority 
belies the broad latitude of the plain meaning of the word 
used by the Framers.  The Framers did not modify the term by 
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 The Majority‟s definition is even more technical since it 
intertwines the practices of a hodgepodge of state 
constitutions and state governors‟ practices.  It is highly 
unlikely that early citizens would have made such a strained 
correlation; in other words, it would not have been “obvious” 
to an average citizen to look to state constitutions, let alone to 
know which two of the twelve constitutions of the ratifying 
states to analyze.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 (“In 
interpreting this text, we are guided by the principle that 
„[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; 
its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary 
as distinguished from technical meaning.‟” (quoting United 
States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931))).  It may be 
reasonable to expect the average citizen to have knowledge of 
the words in a dictionary, but it is a very different expectation 
to assume that they would be able to reference state 
constitutions.  
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describing it as “the intersession Recess” or “the Recess 
between Sessions” — they deliberately used a less qualified 
and, duly, broader term.  To interpret the text otherwise also 
seems less plausible since it is far-fetched to suppose that the 
Framers expected for the Recess Appointments Clause to be 
interpreted through the textual hopscotch needed to arrive at 
the intersession interpretation.  Such a patchy guesswork does 
not conjure the “obvious meaning” described by Hamilton.12  
The Federalist No. 67, at 409 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 The Majority attempts to thread together several 
divergent lines of reasoning for why “the Recess” should be 
limited to intersession recesses, but each of these lines frays 
too easily.  To begin with, there is no evidence that the 
Framers based the terms used in the Constitution on 
Jefferson‟s A Manual of Parliamentary Practice and the 
Majority readily admits that the correlation between the 
                                              
12
 In addition, the Framers used the singular “Recess” rather 
than the plural “Recesses” but this distinction reveals little.  
Given the multiple intersession recesses, and multiple 
intrasession recesses, during and between the regular sessions 
of Congress, the singular “Recess” cannot refer literally to a 
single recess of the Senate (for instance, the single Recess 
that happens between the last regular session of one Congress 
and the first regular session of the following Congress).  The 
only other use of “Recess” in the Constitution, which appears 
in Article I, Section 3, Clause 2, also does not literally refer to 
a single type of recess.  Used in the context of “the Recess of 
the Legislature of any State”, the Article I “Recess” does not 
refer to a particular recess since it was used to generically 
refer collectively to the recesses of every state‟s legislature. 
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Constitution‟s terminology and Jefferson‟s treatise is rather 
tenuous.  (Majority Op. at 45.)  Further, while it may be 
reasonable to assume that the Framers were aware of the 
parliamentary procedures described by Jefferson in A Manual 
of Parliamentary Practice, it is less reasonable to assume that 
the Framers intentionally based their use of “recess” and 
“adjournment” in the Constitution on particular terms used in 
Jefferson‟s treatise without any reference.13 
 The Majority‟s discussion of early state constitutions is 
similarly off the mark.  Noticeably absent from the Majority‟s 
analysis of state constitutions is any reference to the 
constitution of North Carolina, which is generally accepted as 
a model used by the Framers in drafting the Recess 
Appointments Clause.  See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 501; 
Office of Legal Counsel, Lawfulness of Recess Appointments 
During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro 
Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C. 1, 10 n.14 (2012) (“The 
[Recess Appointments] Clause, which was proposed by a 
North Carolina delegate, is generally considered to have been 
based on a similar provision then in the North Carolina 
Constitution.”).  Further, despite the Majority‟s reliance, it is 
unclear that the Massachusetts and New Hampshire 
constitutions have any connection to “the Recess” except for 
                                              
13
 The Majority attempts to draw significance from the “of the 
Senate” language but this phrase could not be plainer.  
(Majority Op. at 42.)  It means exactly what is says and there 
is no indication, whatsoever, that the Framers used that phrase 
to indicate that they were relying on the “recess” as it might 
be defined in Jefferson‟s A Manual of Parliamentary 
Practice.   
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the fact that representatives from those states ratified the 
Constitution.   
 Finally, based on its analysis of a smattering of early 
state practices and state constitutions, the Majority concludes 
that “Recess” must refer to a break of a “considerable period 
of time” and must be marked by when the Senate adjourns.  
This point fares no better.  One flaw in these two 
characteristics is that a “considerable period of time” lacks a 
limiting principle since “considerable” is a relative term.  
(Unsurprisingly, the Majority finds such a lack of a limiting 
principle problematic for intrasession recesses.)  While I 
agree that “Recess” does not refer to the day-to-day recesses 
between daily sessions of the Senate (or its breaks for lunch 
and the weekend), the Majority‟s method of interpretation is 
dubious.  From a mere three instances of intrasession breaks 
by three state governors over 200 years ago, the Majority 
extrapolates this characteristic.  (Majority Op. at 54.)  But 
three actions by different state governors is thin ice upon 
which to interpret our Constitution.   
 
B. The Intent of the Framers and the Purpose of the 
Recess Appointments Clause 
 While the proper starting point, textual interpretation 
of the Recess Appointments Clause is nettlesome because the 
Constitution was not written with a definition of terms 
section.  With such difficulty in its textual interpretation, 
other sources, namely the intent of the Framers, the purpose 
of the Constitution and its Recess Appointments Clause, and 
the tradition and practice of the President and the Senate, are 
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pivotal in arriving at an intelligent and sensible definition of 
“the Recess”.   
 
1. The Framers’ Intent 
 The Framers‟ purpose in creating the separation of 
powers was to devise a system of equal give and take, so that 
the President and the Senate, while not beholden to each 
other, would be forced to work with each other and reach 
compromise.
14
  By protecting the governmental architecture 
that the Framers inscribed in the Constitution, the inclusion of 
intrasession recesses in “the Recess” is most faithful to the 
intent of the Framers.  The Majority‟s definition of “the 
Recess” essentially tips that balance in favor of the Senate 
and, therefore, upsets the applecart of the balance of powers.  
The Majority states that the “most significant weakness” of 
                                              
14
 To discern the Framers‟ intent, one reliable source is The 
Federalist Papers.  See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 
654, 659 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 129 (1976); 
see e.g., Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, 598; United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549, 552, 576-77 (1995); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919, 947, 950, 955 n.21 (1983).  The Federalist Papers that 
directly comment on the Recess Appointments Clause and the 
Appointments Clause are useful sources of edification, but 
also helpful are those Federalist papers that articulate the 
philosophy and principles guiding the operation of the 
Constitution as a whole, particularly those concerning the 
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances.  
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).   
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the intrasession recess definition is that it lacks a discrete day 
limit.  But nothing in the Constitution or the intent of the 
Framers suggests that such a finite day limit is necessary to 
the definition of the Recess Appointments Clause.  The 
fragile balance of power underlying the recess appointments 
process is inconsistent with specific time strictures and 
neither the Constitution nor the Framers contemplated such 
exactitude. 
 In The Federalist No. 67, Hamilton established that the 
President‟s recess appointment power is “nothing more than a 
supplement” and an “auxiliary method of appointment” to be 
used when “the general method [of seeking the Senate‟s 
advice and consent] was inadequate.”  The Federalist No. 67, 
at 409 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
Beyond these few sentiments, the Recess Appointments 
Clause cannot be fully understood in isolation but only within 
the fabric and spirit of the Constitution as a whole.  Other 
Federalist papers, which describe the separation of our 
government‟s powers, instruct that the power of appointment 
must be coordinated so that no branch can “possess, directly 
or indirectly, an overruling influence over the others.”  The 
Federalist No. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961).  The wisdom of this structuring is borne out in the 
appointments process because the recess appointment power 
and the advice and consent power, as any well-defined check, 
are not absolute, but cabined, in their design. 
 While it cannot function as an absolute negative, the 
recess appointment power must provide some balance to the 
Senate‟s power to provide or withhold advice and consent.  
The Federalist No. 73, at 442 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“From these clear and indubitable 
principles [of legislative overreach] results the propriety of a 
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negative, either absolute or qualified, in the executive upon 
the acts of the legislative branches.”).  Both James Madison 
and Hamilton recognized the zealousness of the legislature 
and the importance of establishing checks to counteract its 
overruling influence.  The Federalist No. 51, at 322 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (explaining that, while 
the executive predominates in a monarchy, “[i]n republican 
government, the legislative authority necessarily 
predominates”).  Without such a counterbalance, the Senate‟s 
advice and consent power could degenerate into an absolute 
negative that would undermine the President‟s recess 
appointment power, along with the entire appointments 
process.
15
  See The Federalist No. 48, at 309-10 (James 
Madison), No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961).    
 Consequently, to protect this separation and balance of 
powers, the President must be formidable enough to 
countermand Congress and prevent the Senate from 
eviscerating his appointments prerogative through its use of 
advice and consent.  See Myers, 272 U.S. at 116-17 (“The 
debates in the Constitutional Convention indicated an 
intention to create a strong executive . . . .”).  It is critical that 
the President be afforded greater checks to guard against the 
                                              
15
 In this respect, the advice and consent power of the Senate 
mimics the veto power of the President since they are both 
qualified negatives on the other branch‟s inherent power.  See 
Myers, 272 U.S. at 120 (calling the advice and consent power 
“the Senate‟s veto on the President‟s power of appointment”).  
Just as the veto power cannot exist without a check, the 
advice and consent power of the Senate cannot exist without a 
check.  
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coercion of Congress since the executive is the inherently 
weaker branch of government.  The Federalist No. 51, at 322-
23 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“As the 
weight of the legislative authority requires that it should be 
thus divided, the weakness of the executive may require, on 
the other hand, that it should be fortified.”).   
 In many ways, the check of the Recess Appointments 
Clause also resembles the Pocket Veto Clause in Article I, 
Section 7.  Interestingly, Justice Joseph Story remarked that 
without the pocket veto “[C]ongress might . . . defeat the due 
exercise of [the President‟s] qualified negative by a 
termination of the session, which would render it impossible 
for the President to return the bill.”  2 Joseph Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution § 888, at 354-55 (1833).   
Likewise, without intrasession recess appointments, the 
Majority‟s position makes it impossible for the President to 
exert his necessary influence in the appointment of his 
executive officers since the Senate could too easily wrest that 
power from him through procedural machinations.
16
 
                                              
16
 Like the veto power, the recess appointment power is a 
check that the President exerts against the Senate, such that 
both are shaped by the same principles of governmental 
design.  Further, the Framers‟ motivation for creating the 
President‟s veto power underlies the other checks it has given 
the President.  Primarily, that motivation was the “propensity 
of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to 
absorb the powers, of the other departments [which] has been 
already more than once suggested.”  The Federalist No. 73, at 
442 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
Hamilton also believed that giving the President such strong 
checks on Congress would not lead him to abuse his power.  
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 With these considerations in mind, courts must 
proceed carefully in construing the executive power narrowly.  
The stakes are too high and the consequences too dire if the 
executive power is unduly constricted.  See Marshall Field & 
Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670 (1892) (assessing the severe 
consequences of the judiciary interceding in the actions of the 
other branches of government); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 
211 (1962); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
U.S. 579, 640 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“However, 
because the President does not enjoy unmentioned powers 
does not mean that the mentioned ones should be narrowed 
by a niggardly construction.”). 
 Ultimately, the executive power must be strong 
enough to allow the President to “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed” and “Commission all the Officers of the 
United States.”  U.S. Const. art. II, § 3, cl. 1.  The central role 
of the President in appointing the officers serving his branch 
of government was devised by the Framers with great 
                                                                                                     
He surmised that, “[i]f a magistrate so powerful and so well 
fortified as a British monarch would have scruples about the 
exercise of the [veto power], how much greater caution may 
be reasonably expected in a President of the United States, 
clothed for the short period of four years with the executive 
authority of a government wholly and purely republican?”  Id. 
at 444.  “[A]s a rule,” Hamilton wrote, “one man of 
discernment is better fitted to analyze and estimate the 
peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of 
men of equal or perhaps even of superior discernment” since 
the legislature is more easily captured by private interests.  
The Federalist No. 76, at 455-56 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).    
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purpose.  See Myers, 272 U.S. at 117-19.  By having a hand 
in choosing the officers serving in his branch, the President 
would be able to surround himself with the people he 
believed best fit to help him fulfill his duty to faithfully 
execute the laws under the Take Care Clause.  See id.  Not 
only does he need to have input in the officers chosen, but the 
President needs the power to keep offices occupied in order to 
keep his branch and the government, as a whole, running.  
Therefore, ensuring that the Senate does not unduly encroach 
upon the President‟s role in the appointments process is 
integral to ensuring that the President is able to faithfully 
execute his duties.  Id. at 117-18 (“[The President‟s] selection 
of administrative officers is essential to the execution of the 
laws by him . . . .”). 
 
2. The Purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause 
 The purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, 
which is much more ascertainable than the textual 
interpretation of “the Recess”, offers further guidance in this 
construction of the Recess Appointments Clause and the 
meaning that should be ascribed to “the Recess”.  In The 
Federalist No. 67, Hamilton pinpointed the dual purposes of 
the Recess Appointments Clause, which are 1) to allow the 
Senate to take breaks and 2) to keep offices filled (since “it 
might be necessary for the public service to fill [vacancies] 
without delay”).17  The Federalist No. 67, at 410 (Alexander 
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 In addition, other contemporaneous writings reveal that the 
reason why the Senate was given the check of providing 
advice and consent on appointments was that representatives 
of the smaller states were worried that the larger states would 
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Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  To Madison, this 
meant that the Senate would be recessed for purposes of the 
Recess Appointments Clause when Senators were not in 
“continual residence” in the Capitol.  3 Elliott‟s Debates 409-
10 (statement of James Madison at the Virginia convention). 
 Thus, as imagined by the Framers, the Recess 
Appointments Clause had a two-part purpose: to allow the 
Senate to break from its usual business and, in that absence, 
to allow vacant offices to be filled in order to keep the 
machinery of government running.  See Evans, 387 F.3d at 
1226 (“[W]hat we understand to be the main purpose of the 
Recess Appointments Clause—to enable the President to fill 
vacancies to assure the proper functioning of our 
government—supports reading both intrasession recesses and 
intersession recesses as within the correct scope of the 
Clause.”).   
 The Majority claims that a “crucial” purpose of the 
Recess Appointments Clause is to preserve the Senate‟s 
advice and consent power by limiting the President‟s 
unilateral appointment power.  (Majority Op. at 60-61.)  This 
misses the intent of the Framers.  It is indisputable that the 
Recess Appointments Clause gives the President additional 
power, so why would the Framers limit the President‟s power 
by giving him additional power?  There is no dispute that 
there are limitations written into the Recess Appointments 
Clause, but all the separate powers of the appointments 
                                                                                                     
be favored in the appointments process.  See Myers, 272 U.S. 
at 119-20.  This purpose is not served any more or less by 
intrasession recess appointments than intersession recess 
appointments. 
28 
 
process have limitations despite being drafted to give a 
branch enhanced power.  Further, nothing in the 
contemporaneous writings, especially The Federalist Papers, 
claims that this was a “crucial” purpose of the Recess 
Appointments Clause, let alone any other purpose.   
 In the words of Justice Story, the purpose of the 
Recess Appointments Clause was “convenience, promptitude 
of action, and general security.”  3 Joseph Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution § 1551, at 410 (1833).  
Moreover, consistent with the Framers‟ principles underlying 
the framework of our republic, the purpose of the Recess 
Appointments Clause was also to provide a check on the 
Senate‟s control over the appointment of officers by sharing 
the power of confirmation with the executive branch.  
Allowing the advice and consent of the Senate to act as an 
absolute negative on the President‟s nominations without a 
check would defeat the dual purposes of the Recess 
Appointments Clause and allow “advice and consent” to be 
aggrandized into the “mandate and order” of the Senate.  See 
Myers, 272 U.S. at 118 (characterizing the Senate‟s advice 
and consent as a “limitation[] upon the general grant of the 
executive power, and as such, being [a] limitation[], should 
not be enlarged beyond the words used”).   
 As a check, though, the Recess Appointments Clause 
is by no means absolute.  Thus, although allowing the 
President to make intrasession recess appointments increases 
his clout in the appointments process, his power to make 
recess appointments has embedded limitations.  First, the 
recess appointment power can only be used when the Senate 
is recessed.  If the Senate wants to curb the President‟s use of 
recess appointments, it can simply remain available to 
provide advice and consent, thereby forcing the President to 
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rely on its advice and consent in making appointments.
18
  
Second, recess appointments have a temporary duration since 
they only last until “the End of [the Senate‟s] next Session.”  
At most, this allows the term of a recess appointee to last the 
length of two regular sessions (under current Senate practices, 
this equates to a maximum of approximately two years).  
Third, as evidenced by the structure of Article II, Section 2, 
the recess appointment power can only be a secondary means 
of appointing officers and can never be used as a primary 
means of doing so as long as the Senate is available to 
provide advice and consent.   
 Nevertheless, the Majority concludes that intrasession 
recess appointments would allow the President to circumvent 
the Senate‟s role in the appointments process; however, 
protection against such circumvention is built into the Recess 
Appointments Clause.  By these three limiting principles, 
alone, the President pays a steep price for using his recess 
appointment power.  See United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 
1008, 1014 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (observing that a recess-
appointed Article III judge “lacks life tenure and is not 
protected from salary diminution” such that the “[recess 
appointment] power is not unfettered . . . but is subject to its 
own limitations and safeguards”).  Indeed, these strictures on 
the President‟s recess appointment power prevent him from 
usurping the Senate‟s power to provide advice and consent.  
Moreover, use of the recess appointment power during 
intrasession recesses does not undermine the reason why the 
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 Of course, reference to advice and consent in this context 
does not include pro forma sessions, which clearly do not 
provide an opportunity for the Senate to provide its advice 
and consent.  This point will be elaborated further infra.  
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Framers granted the Senate the power of advice and consent, 
which was preventing larger states from having a 
disproportionate influence on appointments, any more than 
use of the recess appointment power during intersession 
recesses.  See Myers, 272 U.S. at 119-20.  With these 
strictures, the Majority‟s concern about the President making 
unannounced recess appointments “by waiting until [the 
Senators] go home for the evening” is not fathomable.  
(Majority Op. at 64.) 
 But these are not the only limiting principles cabining 
the President‟s recess appointment power.  In addition to 
these express checks, there are implicit checks on the use of 
his recess appointment power that were recognized by the 
Framers.  Firstly, as explained in The Federalist Papers, the 
structure of the branches of government, as conceived by the 
Constitution, give the President a very strong interest in 
maintaining the favor of the Senate and not stoking its ire.  
The Federalist No. 77, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[A] new President would be restrained 
from attempting a change in favor of a person more agreeable 
to him by the apprehension that a discountenance of the 
Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of 
discredit upon himself.”).  Secondly, the President is 
beholden to public opinion.  See The Federalist No. 73, at 444 
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); 3 Joseph 
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 1523, at 375 
(1833) (“He will be compelled to consult public opinion in 
the most important appointments . . . . If he should act 
otherwise, and surrender the public patronage into the hands 
of profligate men, or low adventurers, it will be impossible 
for him long to retain public favour.”); Myers, 272 U.S. at 
123.  Because of public opinion, the President is incentivized 
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to use his recess appointment power sparingly, lest the public 
perceive that he is trying to thwart the advice and consent of 
the Senators that they have elected to office, or lest the public 
lack faith in his appointees because they have not been vetted 
by the Senators that they have elected to office.  Thirdly, as 
far as mechanics, the Senate can check the President‟s use of 
his recess appointment power during intrasession recesses by 
controlling when it recesses and how long it stays in regular 
sessions.  As a result, it can control if the President is able to 
use his recess appointment power at all and how long his 
recess appointees will remain in office.   
 What the Majority overlooks is the following: The 
problem with limiting the Recess Appointments Clause to 
intersession recesses is that such an interpretation disarms the 
reciprocal checks that the President needs to have on the 
Senate.  While the President pays a steep price for foregoing 
the advice and consent of the Senate, the Senate pays a 
relatively low price for thwarting the President‟s power to 
make recess appointments by, for example, reducing its 
intersession recesses to negligible periods of time (for 
instance, one day).  Consequently, the safeguard against the 
encroachment of the Senate on the power of the President is 
much weaker.  The great harm is that the Senate may engage 
in machinations, as some would argue is the case with pro 
forma sessions, to avoid voting on nominees in order to 
strong-arm the President into capitulating to its demands, 
forcing the President to nominate the Senate‟s preferred 
candidates or else leave offices vacant, as Hamilton expressly 
feared.  It is inconceivable that the Framers intended such 
strong-arming by the Senate; of equal, and possibly greater, 
concern is the House‟s involvement in the strong-arming, 
32 
 
which surely was not intended by the Framers.
19
  See The 
Federalist No. 51, at 322 (James Madison), No. 73, at 442-43 
(Alexander Hamilton), No. 76, at 455-56 (Alexander 
Hamilton), No. 77, at 463 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter ed., 1961).   
 Therefore, the President must be able to exercise his 
recess appointment power whenever the Senate is not 
available to provide advice and consent, including when the 
Senate is holding pro forma sessions, when it is not readily 
available to be present to deliberate and vote on nominees.  
Just as it is incredulous to suggest that the President can make 
recess appointments during the Senate‟s lunch, it is equally 
incredulous for the Majority to suggest that advice and 
consent can be provided in thirty-second increments once 
every three days.  (In fact, it may be more incredulous since it 
presumably takes longer than thirty seconds for 100 Senators 
to act on a nomination.)  Further, conducting business via 
unanimous consent agreement, as the Senate did on 
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 The Majority suggests that the issue of the House exerting 
influence over recess appointments is remedied by the 
President‟s ability to adjourn both houses if they cannot agree 
on a date of adjournment.  U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.  This 
assertion misses the mark.  This power of the President does 
not address the issue of the House essentially creating pro 
forma sessions to corrupt the intersession-intrasession 
dynamic.  The Majority‟s remedy is tantamount to saying that 
the President can initiate an adjournment sine die to create an 
intersession recess of more than three days whenever he 
wishes to utilize the Recess Appointments Clause.  This is not 
true.  Moreover, this clearly would not be a supplemental use 
of his recess appointment power. 
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December 23, 2011, is not the type of business that yields the 
advice and consent envisioned by the Framers.
20
   
 The Constitution does not contemplate that the Senate 
may have it both ways.  The Senate cannot be both 
unavailable and yet force the President to submit to its advice 
and consent.  This dynamic acts as a check on Senate 
coercion (and House coercion) because, in order to take 
recesses and breaks from its regular business, the Senate will 
either have to cooperate with the President and figure out 
mutually acceptable nominees or will have to yield its advice 
and consent power to the President‟s recess appointment 
power. 
 Along these lines, the Supreme Court has applied a 
functional approach in determining the scope of executive 
powers.  It did so in determining when the Senate is available 
to receive a bill from the President for the purposes of the 
Pocket Veto Clause, concluding that having a secretary of the 
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 The Majority assumes that the Senate could have simply 
remained available to provide advice and consent by not 
agreeing to not conduct business during the pro forma 
sessions or “alter[ing] its procedures to allow messages to be 
received during such sessions.”  (Majority Op. at 99.)  First, it 
is a stretch to suggest that the receipt of messages from the 
President equates to providing advice and consent.  In that 
respect, the Senate could remain available to provide advice 
and consent even during intersession recesses by leaving an 
agent of the Senate to receive messages.  Second, the 
Majority identifies the danger of its own definition of 
“Recess”: The Senate‟s procedures are too easily 
manipulated. 
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Senate present was sufficient, even if the members of the 
Senate had already departed to their home states.  See The 
Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 680 (holding that “the 
determinative question in reference to an „adjournment‟ is not 
whether it is a final adjournment of Congress or an interim 
adjournment, such as an adjournment of the first session, but 
whether it is one that „prevents‟ the President from returning 
the bill to the House in which it originated within the time 
allowed”).  
 Of course, providing advice and consent on nominees 
likely requires more on the part of Congress than receiving a 
bill from the President — unlike with the Pocket Veto Clause, 
one person cannot generally provide advice and consent on 
behalf of all 100 Senators.  If this functional approach is used 
to effect the purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause, 
then the President must be able to make recess appointments 
when the Senate cannot provide advice and consent, and it is 
certainly possible for the Senate to lack that capacity to 
provide advice and consent during intrasession recesses when 
its members are not present in the Senate chamber to vote.  
 Pro forma sessions, if accepted as valid, undeniably 
frustrate the purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause.  
The pro forma sessions, and Congress‟s other attempts to 
manipulate the appointments process, appear to be the type of 
legislative overreaching chronicled by the Framers.  See The 
Federalist No. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (“The legislative department is everywhere 
extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into 
its impetuous vortex.”).  From Madison‟s sentiments, it is 
also evident that the legislature was not the “more feeble” 
branch that would need a “more adequate defense” but, 
rather, the branch that would enfeeble the other branches and 
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require that they be more adequately defended against such 
machinations.  See id. 
 Moreover, under a functional approach, pro forma 
sessions cannot prevent the Senate from recessing for the 
purposes of the Recess Appointments Clause.  When a pro 
forma session is held for approximately thirty seconds by a 
single Senator, the Senate is not able to accomplish the 
function of deliberating about and voting on the President‟s 
nominees.
21
   
 Indeed, the Framers could have faced the same 
dilemma faced by the President in 2010 and 2012 since it was 
entirely possible for the Senate to take short intrasession 
recesses early in our republic.  In such an event, how would 
the Framers have intended for the Recess Appointments 
Clause to operate?  They did not condition the Recess 
Appointments Clause on how far away Senators were from 
the Capitol when they recessed, or how long it would take 
them to return to the Capitol — they simply and only 
conditioned the Recess Appointments Clause on whether the 
Senate was in a recess, breaking from its regular business, 
and unable to provide advice and consent.  Or what if the 
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 For the exact lengths of the pro forma sessions, see 157 
Cong. Rec. S8787 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 2011), 157 Cong. Rec. 
S8789-90 (daily ed. Dec. 23, 2011), 157 Cong. Rec. S8791 
(daily ed. Dec. 27, 2011), 157 Cong. Rec. S8793 (daily ed. 
Dec. 30, 2011), 158 Cong. Rec. S1 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 2012), 
158 Cong. Rec. S3 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2012), 158 Cong. Rec. 
S5 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 2012), 158 Cong. Rec. S7 (daily ed. Jan. 
13, 2012), 158 Cong. Rec. S9 (daily ed. Jan. 17, 2012), 158 
Cong. Rec. S11 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 2012). 
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Senate remained in pro forma sessions while it broke for six 
to nine months, as was its routine at the time of ratification, 
hoping that this would prevent the President from making 
recess appointments? 
 In such scenarios, the Framers would have empowered 
the President to make recess appointments.  An empty office 
is an empty office.  It makes no sense that the Framers would 
have differentiated between intrasession and intersession 
recesses in effectuating the purpose of the Recess 
Appointments Clause.  See Evans, 387 F.3d at 1226 (“The 
purpose of the Clause is no less satisfied during an 
intrasession recess than during a recess of potentially even 
shorter duration that comes as an intersession break.”).  The 
atrophy of agencies and other offices caused by the Senate‟s 
absence did not then, and does not now, depend on whether 
the Senate is unavailable due to an intersession recess or 
intrasession recess — all that matters is the length of time that 
the Senate is away from its usual business, unable to provide 
advice and consent, while vacancies persist.
22
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 The other purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause, 
allowing the Senate to recess without leaving offices vacant, 
is also diminished by the Majority‟s definition of “Recess”.  
Under the Majority‟s limited reading, the Senate might feel 
obliged not to take intrasession recesses when nominations 
are pending, and not feel at liberty to break, as Hamilton and 
the Framers desired, lest it cause a vacancy to remain open 
for the duration of its recess.  This would have been traumatic 
during the era of the Framers: Imagine Senators packed and 
ready for their long journeys to their home states, only to find 
out that a cabinet secretary has suddenly resigned office.  
Rather than leaving the office of a secretary vacant for six to 
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 Accordingly, the lack of an exact limiting principle, 
such as a day limit, does not provide sufficient reason to 
exclude intrasession recesses from “the Recess”.  First of all, 
any limit would be arbitrary.  The ten-day limit proposed by 
Attorney General Daugherty, who issued the 1921 opinion in 
support of intrasession recess appointments, was not based on 
any identifiable principle; such a hard limit could be tied to 
the Pocket Veto Clause but there is no proof of a relationship 
between it and the Recess Appointments Clause and the 
processes of each are different, as conceived by the Framers 
and in the Constitution.  The only day limit that might not be 
arbitrary is the three-day limit based on the Adjournments 
Clause but, as discussed, there is no real connection between 
                                                                                                     
nine months, the Senators might very well feel compelled to 
remain in the Capitol to provide advice and consent for the 
new appointment, a process which could take weeks or 
months.  Surely, this is not what the Framers envisioned, nor 
intended.  This would also put undue pressure on the Senate 
to rush in making its appointment decisions when the Framers 
clearly intended that officers be appointed with careful 
deliberation.  
 Even with a less extreme example, we can imagine the 
same imposition on the Senate.  As mentioned, it is no secret 
that the advice and consent process is a lengthy and strenuous 
process.  See Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 508 (calling the 
advice and consent process “cumbersome”); United States v. 
Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 710 (2d Cir. 1962) (noting that the 
appointments process is onerous because of the “difficult task 
of securing a competent replacement”).   
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the Adjournments Clause and the Recess Appointments 
Clause.   
 An alternative explanation for such a three-day limit 
would be that a recess of two days, over a weekend, should 
not constitute a recess sufficient to take the Senate away from 
its business.  See Edward A. Hartnett, Recess Appointments of 
Article III Judges: Three Constitutional Questions, 26 
Cardozo L. Rev. 377, 419-20 (2005).  This would also 
prevent the extreme situation of lunchtime appointments and 
overnight appointments between daily sessions, which no 
party, and no court, has suggested is reasonable. 
 Due to this lack of a limiting principle, the Majority 
blithely asserts that intrasession recesses would betray the 
purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause because it would 
allow the President to make recess appointments any time the 
Senate breaks from its usual business, such as when it 
recesses for lunch or adjourns at the end of a daily session.  
The Majority is mistaken because there is no evidence that 
the Framers intended for the Recess Appointments Clause to 
be used this way and there is no evidence that any President 
ever has.  It is beyond contention that the President cannot 
use his recess appointment power during the Senate‟s lunch 
break, when it adjourns nightly between daily sessions, or 
when it adjourns for the weekend.  See Noel Canning, 705 
F.3d at 500 (determining that “the Framers intended 
something specific by the term „the Recess,‟ and that it was 
something different than a generic break in proceedings”).  
All of these recesses are regular breaks of the Senate, which 
do not impede its normal business.  It would be preposterous 
to suggest that the Framers intended for the Senate to be held 
hostage in its chamber in order to retain its power to provide 
advice and consent.   
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 The Majority‟s concern about the “temporal reach” 
and duration of intrasession recesses also overlooks the 
reality that there is little difference between the temporality of 
intersession recesses and intrasession recesses in theory or in 
practice.  If the concern is that intrasession recesses may be 
too short, then one must also recognize that intersession 
recesses can be just as short or shorter than intrasession 
recesses.  Similarly, if the concern is that “the Recess” must 
last a “non-negligible” number of days, then one must 
recognize that either an intersession or intrasession recess can 
last a “negligible” number of days.  Consequently, it is 
indisputable that intersession recess appointments are 
vulnerable to the same uncertainties and lack of limiting 
principles as intrasession recess appointments.  This 
conclusion cannot be saved by the magic words — the Senate 
“adjourned sine die”.   
 The need to exclude recess appointments during the 
Senate‟s adjournments for lunch, the night, and the weekend 
would explain why the Framers chose to use the limited term 
“Recess” rather than the all-encompassing term 
“Adjournment” in the Recess Appointments Clause.  
“Recess” allows the Senate some leeway to take brief 
adjournments without recessing in a way that permits the 
President to make appointments without its advice and 
consent.  As the Majority itself contends, “the dichotomy 
[between the use of „Adjournment‟ and „Recess‟] must be that 
adjournment results in more breaks than recess does.”  
(Majority Op. at 71.) 
 Further, it would appear unconstitutional for the 
President to use his recess appointment power to make 
appointments during those routine breaks of the Senate.  As 
detailed below, by sitting on his nominations and sabotaging 
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the Senate in such a way, the President would not be using the 
advice and consent of the Senate as his primary means of 
appointing officers, in contravention of the plain structure and 
clear intent of the Framers.   
 The Majority also suggests that the purpose would be 
betrayed by allowing intrasession recess appointments 
because they are subject to variable lengths: An intrasession 
recess appointment made at the beginning of a regular session 
would last two regular sessions, while an intrasession recess 
appointment made at the end of a session would only last one 
regular session.  But nothing in the text of the Constitution, 
the intent of the Framers, or the purpose of the Recess 
Appointments Clause provides evidence that such variability 
is violative.  Firstly, variable lengths are not inherently 
forbidden by the Constitution.  The check on the Recess 
Appointments Clause, by the plain language of the text of the 
Constitution, is that recess appointments have a fixed end, not 
necessarily a fixed length.  There is no language to intuit that 
the Framers had intended otherwise.  Secondly, intersession 
recess appointments are also prone to variable lengths: An 
intersession recess appointment made at the beginning of a 
three-month recess will last three months longer than an 
appointment made at the end of that intersession recess.  Of 
course, post-ratification, when intersession recesses routinely 
lasted six months or longer, the lengths of recess 
appointments could have been even more disparate. 
 The Majority claims that the “End of their next 
Session” language in the Constitution also excludes 
intrasession recesses from the definition of “the Recess” 
because that language allows the Senate only a “single 
chance” to weigh in on appointments.  (Majority Op. at 75-
81.)  But nothing in the language of the Constitution or the 
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intent of the Framers limits the Senate to a “single chance” at 
providing advice and consent.  Even in the passage quoted by 
the Majority, Justice Story only requires that the Senate have 
“an opportunity” to act, rather than a “single opportunity”.  
(Majority Op. at 76.)  What if an appointment is pending 
during one regular session and the President does not make 
any recess appointments during the ensuing intersession 
recess — is the Senate no longer able to provide advice and 
consent in the next regular session because it has already had 
a “single chance” to provide advice and consent?  
 In this manner, including both intersession and 
intrasession recesses within the scope of the recess 
appointment power best realizes the purpose of the Recess 
Appointments Clause, i.e., to keep offices filled and allow the 
Senate to break from its regular business. 
 
C. The Branches’ Historical Tradition and Practice 
 The historical tradition and practice of the branches of 
government is also very persuasive evidence of the meaning 
of the Constitution and endorses the propriety of including 
intrasession recesses in “the Recess”.  See Mistretta v. United 
States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989); The Pocket Veto Case, 279 
U.S. at 688-89; Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 
U.S. 868, 890 (1991) (faulting an interpretation of the 
Constitution that “would undermine longstanding practice”); 
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(“Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting 
government cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, 
but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply 
them.”).  But see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-45 (1983) 
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(noting that the long-term practice of the one-house 
legislative veto could not save it from being held 
unconstitutional).  Moreover, as I have, the Supreme Court 
found its more expansive reading of the Pocket Veto Clause 
corroborated by the “[l]ong settled and established practice” 
of the President, which it said is to be accorded “great weight 
in a proper interpretation of constitutional provisions of this 
character.”  The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 689.   
 Further, in reviewing the tradition and practice of the 
President, presidential actions are entitled to a presumption of 
constitutionality.
23
  The Majority rejects any such notion that 
presidential actions deserve special regard, but the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly embraced such a principle.  United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703, 710 (1974) (recognizing 
that “courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to 
Presidential responsibilities”); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951 
(“When any Branch acts, it is presumptively exercising the 
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 Moreover, the early dearth of intrasession recess 
appointments does not provide convincing proof of their 
unconstitutionality.  The President does not lose his 
constitutional powers because he does not use them.  See 
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 880 (affirming that the President cannot 
“waive” his executive powers which provide the structural 
protections of the Constitution); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) (determining that the branches of 
government cannot cede their constitutional powers even if 
they voluntarily consent to do so and have done so for a 
substantial period of time).  Constitutional powers do not 
become unconstitutional simply because they go unused.    
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power the Constitution has delegated to it.  When the 
Executive acts, it presumptively acts in an executive or 
administrative capacity as defined in Art. II.” (citing J.W. 
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928))); 
see also Evans, 387 F.3d at 1222 (“And when the President is 
acting under the color of express authority of the United 
States Constitution, we start with a presumption that his acts 
are constitutional. . . . Just to show that plausible 
interpretations of the pertinent constitutional clause exist 
other than that advanced by the President is not enough.”); 
United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 713-14 (2d Cir. 
1962).  Not only does the President take an oath of fealty to 
the Constitution, and not only is his most important 
constitutional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed,” but such a presumption is integral to the operation 
of the executive branch.  See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (establishing that a practice 
“engaged in by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the 
Constitution . . . may be treated as a gloss on „executive 
Power‟”).   
 The Majority carves out its own exception, suggesting 
that, in particular, no such presumption applies in separation 
of powers cases, but this presumption should apply with the 
most force in such cases.  In executing the duties of his office, 
the President must not be hindered because the 
constitutionality of his actions is held in doubt.  See Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-11 (1962) (emphasizing the 
importance of respecting the finality of the actions of the 
political branches); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236 
(1993) (same).  For a host of self-evident reasons, the 
judiciary should avoid upending longstanding practices of the 
other branches unless they are plainly unconstitutional.  See 
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Noel Canning, 705 F.3d at 515 (Griffith, J., concurring); 
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (acknowledging principles 
of judicial restraint regarding constitutional questions). 
 
1. The Tradition and Practice of the President 
 The tradition and practice of the President, especially 
since 1947, unequivocally shows that intrasession recess 
appointments have been continuously accepted as a 
constitutional use of the executive power.  Since 1947, 
Presidents have made nearly 400 intrasession recess 
appointments without significant rebuke or controversy.  See 
Henry B. Hogue et al., Cong. Research Serv., The Noel 
Canning Decision and Recess Appointments Made from 1981-
2013, at 4 (Feb. 4, 2013).  As it stands, intrasession recess 
appointments have been made as often as intersession recess 
appointments.  Id.  In addition, intrasession recess 
appointments have been condoned by the executive branch 
since at least 1921, even if they did not come into more 
common use until the 1940s.  Despite this historical 
precedent, the Majority concludes that each of these 
Presidents has misinterpreted the Constitution.   
 Recess appointments have been used by Presidents 
ever since the birth of our republic.  President Washington, 
himself, made several recess appointments.  See Edward A. 
Hartnett, Recess Appointments of Article III Judges: Three 
Constitutional Questions, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 377, 385, 387 
(2005).  The recess practices of the Senate have evolved, 
though, which has caused recess appointment practices to 
evolve in response.  Early in our republic, the Senate did not 
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take intrasession recesses and took much longer intersession 
recesses than it does currently.  See Congressional Directory 
for the 112th Congress 522-38 (2011).
24
  According to the 
Congressional Directory, only five intrasession recesses were 
taken before 1860 and, of those five, the two longest were 
thirteen days.  Id.  After 1860, there was a surge in 
intrasession recesses and, since the 37th Congress, there has 
been at least one intrasession recess in each Congress, with 
the exception of approximately five sessions of Congress (out 
of approximately 150 regular sessions of Congress).  Id.  
Thus, intrasession recesses have been the norm since 1860.  
Currently, the Senate takes between five and ten intrasession 
recesses each Congress, meaning that intrasession recesses far 
outnumber intersession recesses.  See Henry B. Hogue, Cong. 
Research Serv., Recess Appointments: Frequently Asked 
Questions 2 (Jan. 9, 2012). 
 Despite the relatively early appearance of intrasession 
recesses, intrasession recess appointments did not come into 
vogue until the 1940s.
25
  As mentioned, Presidents have made 
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 The Congressional Directory only lists recesses of “three or 
more days, excluding Sundays,” so it is possible that the 
Senate took brief intrasession recesses early on.  
Congressional Directory for the 112th Congress 538 n.2 
(2011).  If so, then the dearth of early intrasession recess 
appointments would serve to confirm that intrasession recess 
appointments should not include intrasession recesses of less 
than three days. 
25
 There is only an unexplained lack of intrasession recess 
appointments for the eighty years between 1867 and 1947.  
One possible reason for the near-absence of intrasession 
recess appointments during that period may be that 
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nearly 400 intrasession recess appointments since then.  See 
Henry B. Hogue et al., Cong. Research Serv., The Noel 
Canning Decision and Recess Appointments Made from 1981-
2013, at 4 (Feb. 4, 2013).  Prior to 1947, there were only three 
recorded intrasession recess appointments.  Noel Canning, 
705 F.3d at 502 (citing Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is the 
Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess Appointments 
Clause?, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2204, 2209-12, 2235 (1994)).  The 
                                                                                                     
intersession recesses were still rather lengthy, often spanning 
several months, which gave the President ample time to make 
recess appointments during intersession recesses, compared to 
the relatively short duration of early intrasession recesses.  
Another possible explanation is that the passage of the 
Twentieth Amendment in 1933 forever changed the practices 
of Congress, especially the timing and length of their sessions 
and recesses.  Louis Fisher, Cong. Research Serv., The Pocket 
Veto: Its Current Status 2-3 (Mar. 30, 2001).  Before that 
amendment, there was usually a long first session (often over 
200 days) and a shorter second session (lasting between 80 
and 90 days).  Id. at 2.  As a result, prior to 1934, “a new 
Congress typically would not convene for regular business 
until 13 months after being elected” but, since passage of the 
amendment, “the time from the election to the beginning of 
Congress‟s term as well as when it convened was reduced to 
two months.”  Congressional Directory for the 112th 
Congress 522 (2011).  In addition, as the Congressional 
Directory notes, prior to the Twentieth Amendment, “special 
sessions of the Senate were convened, principally for 
confirming Cabinet and other executive nominations,” which 
could have made intrasession recess appointments less 
important.  Id.  
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first is believed to have been made by President Andrew 
Johnson in 1867, which coincides with the surge in 
intrasession recesses that began in the 1860s.  See Noel 
Canning, 705 F.3d at 501.  As such, there is no reasonable 
inference that can be drawn about intrasession recesses except 
that the practices of the Senate prior to the Twentieth 
Amendment made the timing of recesses less of an issue than 
is the case now. 
 In the modern day, intrasession recesses are not only 
more frequent but also longer than they had been in the past.  
In fact, they are sometimes longer than some intersession 
recesses, which can be as short as a day.
26
  With the large 
number of intrasession recesses taken, the net duration of 
intrasession recesses during a session of the Senate will often 
dwarf the net duration of intersession recesses, which means 
that the Senate is on break more often during sessions than 
between sessions. 
 As reflected earlier, given that recess appointments 
have been made for over 220 years and that no intrasession 
(or intersession) recess appointment has been made during a 
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 A close inspection of the Congressional Directory reveals 
that there have been approximately thirteen one-day 
intersession recesses — while not frequent, they are not 
unprecedented and are certainly not an abstract or 
hypothetical possibility.  See Congressional Directory for the 
112th Congress 522 (2011).  (This number excludes one-day 
intersession recesses between a regular session of Congress 
and a special session of Congress.)  The last two one-day 
intersession recesses occurred on January 3, 2012, during the 
series of pro forma sessions, and January 3, 2013.   
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recess of less than ten days in at least the last thirty years, 
critics are wanting to allege that the President would abuse 
his executive power and make a recess appointment while the 
Senate broke for lunch or the end of the day.  In the history of 
our republic, there has been no inkling that any President has 
engaged in that practice and, so, there is no reason to think 
that will happen now.  See Allocco, 305 F.2d at 714 (“We 
have not been directed to a single instance of behavior by any 
President which might be termed an „abuse‟ of the recess 
power.”).   
 
2. The Tradition and Practice of the Senate 
 The tradition and practice of the Senate also affirms 
that “the Recess” includes both intrasession and intersession 
recesses.  In 1903, President Roosevelt made 160 recess 
appointments during what is literally described as a 
momentary intersession recess between the 1st and 2nd 
sessions of the 58th Congress.  T.J. Halstead, Cong. Research 
Serv., Recess Appointments: A Legal Overview 10 (July 26, 
2005).  In response to these recess appointments by President 
Roosevelt, the Senate Judiciary Committee engaged in a 
project to opine on whether such a “constructive recess” of 
the Senate constituted “the Recess” of the Recess 
Appointments Clause.  The committee concluded that it did 
not.  Most telling was the 1905 report, which presented the 
Senate‟s view of the meaning of “recess”, as used in the 
Recess Appointments Clause.  The 1905 Report determined 
that “[t]he word „recess‟ is one of ordinary, not technical, 
signification” and is used in the Recess Appointments Clause 
“in its common and popular sense.”  S. Rep. No. 58-4389, at 
1 (1905) (emphasis added).  
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 This report, if nothing else, endorses a broader, rather 
than a narrower, reading of the term “Recess” in the Recess 
Appointments Clause.  Specifically, the 1905 Report 
explained that “recess” was “evidently intended by the 
[F]ramers of the Constitution that it should mean something 
real, not something imaginary; something actual, not 
something fictitious.”  Id. at 2 (emphasis added).  Very 
pragmatically, the 1905 Report set forth four criteria for 
qualifying a “recess”: 1) the Senate is “not sitting in regular 
or extraordinary session as a branch of the Congress, or in 
extraordinary session for the discharge of executive 
functions,” such that 2) “its members owe no duty of 
attendance,” 3) “its Chamber is empty,” and 4) “it can not 
receive communications from the President or participate as a 
body in making appointments” “because of its absence.”  Id. 
(emphasis in original).  
 In addition to the intent of the Framers and the 
tradition and practice of the President, this definition from the 
1905 Report forecloses the possibility of the President 
making recess appointments when the Senate breaks for 
lunch, for the night, and for the weekend.  During those 
breaks, the Senate‟s capacity to participate as a body in the 
appointments process is not hampered any more than usual.  
In the same way that one of these brief, routine breaks does 
not make the Senate unavailable to provide advice and 
consent, a brief session does not make the Senate available to 
provide advice and consent, which is why the Senate cannot 
possibly provide advice and consent during pro forma 
sessions.   
 The 1905 Report also postulated that the Framers 
intended for the Recess Appointments Clause to serve dual 
purposes that could not be served if those criteria were met: to 
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prevent “grave inconvenience and harm to the public interest” 
and to ensure that “at all times there should be, whether the 
Senate was in session or not, an officer for every office, 
entitled to discharge the duties thereof.”  Id. at 2 (emphasis 
added).  This accords with the purposes established by 
Hamilton in The Federalist No. 67.   
 The Senate has not officially changed positions since 
the issuance of this report.  See Nippon Steel Corp. v. Int’l 
Trade Comm’n, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1374 n.13 (Ct. Int‟l 
Trade 2002) (citing Michael A. Carrier, Note, When Is the 
Senate in Recess for Purposes of the Recess Appointments 
Clause?, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2204 (1994)). 
 Additionally, in an act of legislative acquiescence, 
Congress has passed legislation that observes the possibility 
of intrasession recess appointments.
27
  By its own choice, 
Congress passed, and has not since repealed, the Pay Act, a 
statute that allows recess appointees to be paid and does not 
differentiate between intersession and intrasession recess 
appointees.  5 U.S.C. § 5503; see Evans, 387 F.3d at 1226; 
Woodley, 751 F.2d at 1013.    
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 The Senate Manual also adopts a broader understanding of 
“the Recess” that is conditioned only on the length of a 
recess, rather than whether it occurs intrasession or 
intersession.  According to the Senate Manual, motions to 
reconsider confirmation votes on nominees become moot 
after a thirty-day break, be it an adjournment or recess.  
Senate Manual, S. Doc. No. 112-1, at 58 (2012) (“Standing 
Rules of the Senate”). 
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II. THE VALIDITY OF THE MARCH 27, 2010 AND JANUARY 
4, 2012 RECESS APPOINTMENTS 
 Based on the foregoing analysis, in my judgment, the 
recess appointments of Member Becker on March 27, 2010 
and Members Block, Flynn, and Griffin on January 4, 2012 
are valid.  Both sets of appointments were made during 
intrasession recesses when the Senate was not available to 
provide advice and consent.  The President appropriately 
exercised his discretion, relying on the supplemental power of 
the Recess Appointments Clause to keep those offices filled 
for the sanctity of the public.  The exclusion of intrasession 
recesses from the definition of “the Recess” denies him the 
ability to fulfill his constitutional duty and leads to a number 
of absurd results. 
 The Majority claims that the Senate was available to 
provide advice and consent during the pro forma sessions 
because it could have acted on the Members‟ nominations “if 
it had desired to do so.”  (Majority Op. at 66.)  But this is an 
assumption with dangerous logical extensions.  Under the 
Majority‟s logic, the Senate would always be available to 
provide advice and consent and the President would never be 
able to make recess appointments.  Even during intersession 
recesses, the Senate could plausibly provide advice and 
consent “if it [] desired to” by simply cutting its intersession 
recess short.  It is not as if the Senate is paralyzed while in an 
intersession recess.   
 To demonstrate another absurd result, Riddick‟s 
Senate Procedure documents that there is such a thing as a 
conditional sine die adjournment, which could allow the 
Senate Majority leader to call the Senate back into session on 
24 hours‟ notice to resume the previous session — would 
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such a conditional sine die adjournment to start an 
intersession recess prevent the Senate from fulfilling its desire 
to provide advice and consent?  See Riddick‟s Senate 
Procedure 18; Henry B. Hogue, Cong. Research Serv., Recess 
Appointments: Frequently Asked Questions 1-2 (Jan. 9, 2012) 
(“These adjournment resolutions today usually authorize 
leaders of each chamber to call it back into session after the 
sine die adjournment. If this power is exercised, the previous 
session resumes and continues until the actual sine die 
adjournment is determined, usually pursuant to another 
concurrent resolution of adjournment.” (emphasis added)).   
 Under the Majority‟s interpretation of “the Recess” as 
an intersession recess, the Recess Appointments Clause is 
essentially neutered and the President‟s ability to make recess 
appointments would be eviscerated.  A Senate opposed to the 
President‟s nominees would simply limit its intersession 
recesses to a day, or less, and use its power to provide advice 
and consent as an absolute negative to the President‟s power 
of appointment.  It could then simply convert what would 
have been its intersession recess, when Senators would depart 
to their home states and not conduct business, into an 
intrasession recess.  Thus, by this simple procedural change in 
title, the Senate would strip the President of this essential 
counterbalance in the exercise of his executive power and 
upset the balance of power.  In a worst-case scenario, some 
offices could remain vacant for an entire administration, 
which could be as long as eight years.  In addition, the Senate 
would have a disproportionate amount of influence on the 
President‟s nominees, since he would likely have to accede to 
the demands of the Senate‟s absolute negative. 
 If anything, the Majority‟s test — that an adjournment 
sine die marks an intersession recess — is unworkable and 
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not judicially manageable.  Under the Majority‟s rationale, 
the President could make a recess appointment during any 
intersession recess, even if it only lasted a nanosecond, yet 
could not make a recess appointment during a six-month 
intrasession recess.  This defies common sense and common 
logic.  The Majority itself recognizes that intersession 
recesses suffer from the same lack of an exact durational limit 
as intrasession recesses, which undercuts its suggestion that 
intersession recesses are somehow immune to its criticism of 
intrasession recesses.  (Majority Op. at 100 (“[T]he lack of a 
constitutional basis for selecting a long duration in defining 
intrasession breaks is just as absent to define intersession 
breaks.”).)   
 The Majority further undercuts its distinction between 
intersession and intrasession recesses by stating, without 
reservation, that “the potential for abuse and subsequent 
gridlock lies not in what recess means but in the 
Constitution‟s framework of divided powers.”  (Majority Op. 
at 100.)  This admits that the problem, and solution, lies not in 
the technical, procedural classification of the Senate‟s 
adjournment, but in whether the separation of powers is 
maintained.  Thus, tying the definition of “Recess” to the 
availability of the Senate to provide advice and consent 
achieves the proper focus.  It does so by basing the definition 
on the presence of the Senate‟s mechanism for maintaining 
the separation of powers in the appointments process — 
advice and consent — rather than the procedural 
classification of the recess. 
 Worse, by basing the recess appointment power on the 
Senate‟s procedure, the Majority has committed the Recess 
Appointments Clause to the Senate‟s discretion and 
procedural manipulations.  The impracticability of the 
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Majority‟s standard is shown by the fact that the January 4, 
2012 appointments issue could have simply been avoided if 
the appointments had been made a day earlier, on January 3, 
during the intersession recess.
28
  Not only that, but the 
Majority‟s standard would also allow the President to make 
an unlimited number of recess appointments during the type 
of “fictional” intersession recess exploited by President 
Roosevelt in 1903.  With such absurd results, the Majority‟s 
standard is an artifice that would clearly upset the separation 
of powers integral to a sound appointments process. 
 Under my standard, the entire period during which the 
Senate held pro forma sessions, from December 17, 2011 
until January 23, 2012, would be treated the same.  Thus, the 
Senate would have been no more able to provide advice and 
                                              
28
 The Majority attempts to displace the absurdity of its 
holding by showing that my standard also yields absurd 
results, but the Majority misses my point.  My point is only to 
show that it is absurd to suggest that a one-day intersession 
recess is somehow different than a long intrasession recess.  
Thus, the Majority‟s holding that the President could have 
made a recess appointment on January 3, but not on January 4 
or January 22, means that the one-day intersession recess on 
January 3 was somehow intrinsically different than January 4 
or January 22.  I contend that January 3 is only different 
because it technically has a different definition than January 4 
or January 22 — functionally, all three of those days were the 
same.  Further, there is nothing absurd about treating January 
23 differently than January 22.  There were no Senators who 
owed attendance in the Senate chamber on January 22 but, 
presumably, 100 Senators owed their attendance on January 
23.  
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consent on January 4, 2012 than it was on January 3, 2012.  
And the President would not be able thwart the Senate, as 
President Roosevelt did, by making well over a hundred 
recess appointments during a fictional intersession recess of 
infinitesimal duration. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 Defining the executive role in our system of checks 
and balances is one of the most challenging problems of our 
republic and, consequently, not so easily resolved.  The 
inclusion of intrasession recesses in the ambit of the Recess 
Appointments Clause is the interpretation most faithful to the 
text of the Constitution, the intent of the Framers, the purpose 
of recess appointments, and the tradition and practice of both 
the President and the Senate.  It is for this reason that the 
Majority cannot articulate a constitutional impediment to the 
inclusion of intrasession recesses, or make a constitutional 
case for the categorical exclusion of all intrasession recesses.  
Interpreting “the Recess” to include intrasession recesses best 
maintains the balance of power integral to preserving the 
appointments process intended by the Framers.   
